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The internet is generative: it allows contribution from all
corners, without special accreditation or relationships to gov-
ernment or corporate gatekeepers.' This simple feature has al-
lowed a blossoming of uses and abuses. Privacy problems show-
case issues that can worry individuals who are not concerned
about other problems resulting from the internet's generativity
like copyright infringement, and demonstrate how generativity
puts old problems into very new and perhaps unexpected con-
figurations, calling for creative solutions.
The heart of the next generation privacy problem arises from
the similar but uncoordinated actions of individuals that can be
combined in new ways thanks to the generative Net. Indeed, the
Net puts private individuals in a position to do more to compro-
mise privacy than the government and commercial institutions
traditionally targeted for scrutiny and regulation. The standard
approaches that have been developed to analyze the earlier pri-
vacy threats do not work well for this new breed of the problem,
but solutions applied to generative problems arising at other lay-
ers of the network can be adapted to help.
t Copyright © 2008 Jonathan Zittrain. This article is drawn from Chapter 9 of Jona-
than Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-And How to Stop It (Yale and Penguin UK
2008).
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank Blair Kaminsky for excellent re-
search assistance. http://www.jz.org.
1 See Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 Harv L Rev 1974, 1980
(2006) ("Generativity denotes a technology's overall capacity to produce unprompted
change driven by large, varied, and uncoordinated audiences.'). The internet's generative
character facilitates collaborative endeavors in which people, usually in separate places,
can build on past achievements to create unanticipated innovations. For example, genera-
tivity facilitated the development of the wiki, as well as its use for the encyclopedia that
is Wikipedia. Wikipedia's content is in turn generatively developed, a form of recursive
generativity. For a general overview, see Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-
And How to Stop It 67-100 (Yale and Penguin UK 2008). Five factors determine a sys-
tem's generativity: "(1) how extensively a system or technology leverages a set of possible
tasks; (2) how well it can be adapted to a range of tasks; (3) how easily new contributors
can master it; (4) how accessible it is to those ready and able to build on it; and (5) how
transferable any changes are to others-including (and perhaps especially) nonexperts."
Id at 71.
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I. PRIVACY 1.0
In 1973, a blue-ribbon panel reported to the U.S. Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare ("H.E.W.") on computers and
privacy. The report could have been written today:
It is no wonder that people have come to distrust com-
puter-based record-keeping operations. Even in non-
governmental settings, an individual's control over the
personal information that he gives to an organization, or
that an organization obtains about him, is lessening as
the relationship between the giver and receiver of per-
sonal data grows more attenuated, impersonal, and dif-
fused. There was a time when information about an indi-
vidual tended to be elicited in face-to-face contacts involv-
ing personal trust and a certain symmetry, or balance, be-
tween giver and receiver. Nowadays an individual must
increasingly give information about himself to large and
relatively faceless institutions, for handling and use by
strangers-unknown, unseen and, all too frequently, unre-
sponsive. Sometimes the individual does not even know
that an organization maintains a record about him. Often
he may not see it, much less contest its accuracy, control
its dissemination, or challenge its use by others. 2
The report pinpointed troubles arising not simply from pow-
erful computing technology that could be used both for good and
ill, but also from its impersonal quality: the sterile computer
processed one's warm, three-dimensional life into data handled
and maintained by faraway faceless institutions, viewed at will
by strangers. The worries of that era are anything but obsolete.
We are still concerned about databases with too much informa-
tion that are too readily accessed; databases with inaccurate in-
formation; and having the data from databases built for reason-
able purposes diverted to less noble, if not outright immoral,
uses.
3
Government databases remain of particular concern because
of the unique strength and power of the state to amass informa-
2 Advisory Committee to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Records,
Computers and the Rights of Citizens, § II (1973), available at <http://aspe.hhs.gov/
datacncll1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
3 Consider Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 Stan L Rev 1393 (2001) (examining the dangers to personal
privacy posed by electronic databases).
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tion and use it for life-altering purposes. The day-to-day work-
ings of the government rely on numerous databases, including
those used for the calculation and provision of government bene-
fits, decisions about law enforcement, and inclusion in various
licensing regimes. 4 Private institutional databases also continue
to raise privacy issues, particularly in the realms of consumer
credit reporting, health records, and financial data.
Over three decades ago, the H.E.W. report raised strikingly
similar concerns. Due to political momentum generated by the
H.E.W. report and the growing controversy over President Rich-
ard Nixon's use of government power to investigate political
enemies, the U.S. Congress enacted comprehensive privacy legis-
lation shortly after the report's release. The Privacy Act of 1974
mandated a set of fair information practices, including disclosure
of private information only with an individual's consent (with
exceptions for law enforcement, archiving, and routine uses), and
established the right of the subject to know what was recorded
about her and to offer corrections. While it was originally in-
tended to apply to a broad range of public and private databases
to parallel the recommendations of the H.E.W. report, the Act
was amended before passage to apply only to government agen-
cies' records. 5 Congress never enacted a comparable comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme for private databases. Instead, private
databases are regulated only in narrow areas of sensitivity such
as credit reports (addressed by a complex scheme passed in 1970
affecting the handful of credit reporting agencies) 6 and video ren-
tal data,7 which has been protected since Supreme Court nomi-
nee Robert Bork's video rental history was leaked to a newspaper
during his confirmation process in 1987.8
4 For a general discussion, see id.
5 US Congress Sen Comm on Govt Operations and US H Govt Operations Subcomm
on Govt Info & Individual Rights, Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, at 9-28,
97-150, available at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdfLH-privacy-act-
1974.pdf> (last visited Feb 21, 2008) (reporting that Senate Bill 3418 initially covered all
organizations that collected personal information, but the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations limited the bill's scope to the federal government).
6 See Fair Credit Reporting Act § 602, 15 USC § 1681 (2006) (requiring "consumer
reporting agencies [to] adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is
fair and equitable to the consumer").
7 See 18 USC § 2710 (2000) ("A video tape service provider who knowingly discloses,
to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such pro-
vider shall be liable to the aggrieved person .... ").
8 Electronic Privacy Info Center, The Video Privacy Protection Act ("VPPA"), avail-
able at <http://www.epic.org/privacy/vppa/> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
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The H.E.W. report expresses a basic template for dealing
with the informational privacy problem: first, a sensitivity is
identified regarding some stage of the information production
process-the gathering, storage, or dissemination of one's private
information-and then a legal regime is proposed to restrict
these activities to legitimate ends. This template has informed
analysis for the past thirty years, guiding battles over privacy
both between individuals and government and between individu-
als and "large and faceless" corporations. Of course, a functional
theory does not necessarily translate into successful practice.
Pressures to gather and use personal data in commerce and law
enforcement have increased, and technological tools to facilitate
such data processing have matured without correspondingly ag-
gressive privacy protections. 9 In 1999, Scott McNealy, CEO of
Sun Microsystems, was asked whether a new Sun technology to
link consumer devices had any built-in privacy protection. "You
have zero privacy anyway," he replied. "Get over it." 10
McNealy's words raised some ire at the time; one privacy
advocate called them "tantamount to a declaration of war."11
McNealy has since indicated that he believes his answer was mi-
sunderstood. 12 But the plain meaning of "getting over it" seems
to have been heeded: while poll after poll indicates that the pub-
lic is concerned about privacy, 13 the public's actions frequently
belie these claims. Apart from momentary spikes in privacy con-
cern that typically follow high-profile scandals-such as Water-
9 See Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st Century
1-36 (O'Reilly 2000).
10 Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: 'Get Over It, Wired (Jan 26, 1999), available at
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, 1283,17538,00.html> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
11 Id.
12 Email from Jim Waldo, Engineer, Sun Microsystems (Apr 18, 2007) (on file with
author) (recounting a conversation with McNealy in which McNealy seemed to indicate
that "the statement that you have no privacy is not so much about your privacy being
taken away by technology, but about your lack of privacy in the non-technology world.").
13 ASNE Freedom of Info Comm and First Amendment Center, Freedom of Informa-
tion in the Digital Age 10-12, 15 (2001), available at <http://www.freedomforum.org/
publicationsfirstfoi/foiinthedigitalage.pdf> (last visited Feb 21, 2008) (finding that 89
percent of adults surveyed were concerned, or very concerned, about personal privacy,
and that nearly identical percentages reported that they were concerned about crime,
access to quality health care, and the future of the social security system); Humphrey
Taylor, Most People Are 'Privacy Pragmatists" Who, While Concerned About Privacy, Will
Sometimes Trade It Off for Other Benefits (Harris Interactive Mar 19, 2003), available at
<http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=365> (last visited Feb 21,
2008) (discussing Harris Poll #17, which found that 69 percent of adults believe consum-
ers have "lost all control of how personal information is collected and used by companies"
and that 53 percent disagreed with the statement that "existing laws and organizational
practices provide a reasonable level of protection for consumer privacy policy").
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gate or the disclosure of Judge Bork's video rentals-we rou-
tinely part with personal information and at least passively con-
sent to its use, whether by surfing the internet, entering sweep-
stakes, or using a supermarket discount card.
Current scholarly work on privacy tries to reconcile people's
nonchalant behavior with their seemingly heartfelt concerns
about privacy. 14 It sometimes calls for industry self-regulation
rather than direct governmental regulation as a way to vindicate
privacy interests, perhaps because such regulation is seen as
more efficient or just, or because direct governmental interven-
tion is understood to be politically difficult to achieve. Privacy
scholarship also looks to the latest advances in specific technolo-
gies that could further weaken day-to-day informational pri-
vacy. 15 One example is the increasing use of radio frequency
identifiers ("RFIDs") in consumer items, allowing goods to be
scanned and tracked at a short distance. One promise of RFID is
that a shopper could wheel her shopping cart under an arch at a
grocery store and obtain an immediate tally of its contents; one
peril is that a stranger could drive by a house with an RFID
scanner and instantly inventory its contents, from diapers to ba-
con to flat-screen TVs, immediately discerning the sort of people
who live within.
This work on privacy generally hews to the original analytic
template of 1973: both the analysis and suggested solutions
speak in terms of institutions gathering data, and of developing
ways to pressure institutions to better respect their customers'
and clients' privacy. This approach is evident in discussions
about electronic commerce on the internet. Privacy advocates
and scholars have sought ways to ensure that websites disclose
to people what they are learning about consumers as they browse
and buy. The notion of "privacy policies" has arisen from this de-
bate. Through a combination of regulatory suasion and industry
best practices, such policies are now found on many websites,
comprising little-read boilerplate answering questions about
14 See, for example, Vera Bergelson, It's Personal But Is It Mine?: Toward Property
Rights in Personal Information, 37 UC Davis L Rev 379 (2003); Solove, 53 Stan L Rev at
1393 (cited in note 3).
15 Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Public Sphere,
62 Wash & Lee L Rev 93 (2005) (discussing privacy concerns that emerge as mobile, wire-
less devices expand internet connectivity); Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, NY Times Al
(Oct 7, 2001) (examining the possible effects of biometric identification technology on
personal privacy); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vul-
nerability, 54 Hastings L J 1227 (2003) (considering identity theft and privacy in the
context of public identification systems and information-storage architectures).
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what information a website gathers about a user and what it
does with the information. 16 Frequently the answers are, respec-
tively, "as much as it can" and "whatever it wants,"-but, to
some, this is progress. A privacy policy allows scholars and com-
panies alike to advance a useful fiction that the user has been
put on notice of privacy practices.
Personal information security is another area of inquiry, and
there have been some valuable policy innovations in this sphere.
For example, a 2003 California law requires firms that uninten-
tionally expose their customers' private data to others to alert
the customers to the security breach.17 This has led to a rash of
well-known banks sending bashful letters to millions of their
customers, gently telling them that, say, a package containing
tapes with their credit card and social security numbers has been
lost en route from one processing center to another.' 8 Bank of
America lost such a backup tape with 1.2 million customer re-
cords in 2005.19 That same year, a MasterCard International
security breach exposed information of more than forty million
credit card holders. 20 Boston College lost 120,000 alumni records
16 For example, Amazon's privacy policy describes various situations in which Ama-
zon shares customer information with others. For instance, the policy notes that Amazon
may provide customer information to third party service providers like delivery compa-
nies and marketing companies. The policy also (vaguely) states that Amazon may release
information when necessary for the "[p]rotection of Amazon.com and others." See Ama-
zon.com Privacy Notice, available at <http://www.amazon.comlgplhelp/customer/display.
html?nodeId=468496#share> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
17 Cal Civil Code § 1798.82 (West 2003) ("Any person or business that conducts busi-
ness in California, and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information, shall disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired
by an unauthorized person."). California legislators are currently considering a variety of
different proposals to amend or repeal portions of this statute.
18 StrongAuth, Inc. maintains a compendium of such disclosures, including those by
MasterCard International, Polo/Ralph Lauren, Bank of America, and several universities.
See StrongAuth, Inc, Newsletter, Washington's SSB 66043 - On the Heel of CA's SB 1386,
(May 5, 2005), available at <http://www.strongauth.com/index.php?option=com-content&
task=view&id=36&Itemid=42> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
19 Robert Lemos, Bank of America Loses a Million Customer Records, (CNET
News.com Feb 25, 2005), available at <http://news.com.com/Bank+of+America+
loses+a+million+customer+records/2100-1029_3-5590989.html?tag-st.rc.targmb> (last
visited Feb 21, 2008). This type of data loss is not uncommon. As one study noted, "60% of
[compromised record] incidents involved organizational mismanagement: personally
identifiable information accidentally placed online, missing equipment, lost backup tapes,
or other administrative errors." Kris Erickson and Philip N. Howard, A Case of Mistaken
Identity? News Accounts of Hacker and Organizational Responsibility for Compromised
Digital Records, 12 J Computer-Mediated Commun (2007), available at <http://jcmc.
indiana.edu/voll2/issue4/erickson.html> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
20 Joris Evers, Credit Card Breach Exposes 40 Million Accounts, CNET News.com
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to hackers as a result of a breach. 21 The number of incidents
shows little sign of decreasing,22 despite the incentives provided
by the embarrassment of disclosure and the existence of obvious
ways to improve security practices. For minimal cost, firms could
minimize some types of privacy risk to consumers-for example,
by encrypting their backup tapes before shipping them any-
where, making them worthless to anyone without a closely held
digital key.
Addressing website privacy and security has led to elabora-
tions on the traditional informational privacy framework. Some
particularly fascinating issues in this framework are still unfold-
ing: is it fair, for example, for an online retailer like Amazon.com
to record the average number of nanoseconds each user spends
contemplating an item before clicking to buy it? Such data could
be used by Amazon.com to charge impulse buyers more, capital-
izing on the likelihood that this group of consumers does not
pause long enough to absorb the listed price of the item they just
bought. A brief experiment by Amazon in differential pricing re-
sulted in bad publicity and a hasty retreat as some buyers no-
ticed that they could save as much as $15 on a DVD by deleting
browser cookies that otherwise indicated to Amazon that they
had visited the site before. 23 As this example suggests, forth-
rightly charging one price to one person and another price to
someone else can generate resistance. Offering individualized
discounts, however, can amount to the same thing for the vendor
while appearing much more palatable to the buyer. Who would
complain about receiving a coupon for $15 off the listed price of
an item, even if the coupon were not transferable to any other
Amazon user? (The answer may be "someone who did not get the
coupon," but to most people the second scenario is less troubling
than the one in which different prices were charged from the
start.)24
(June 20, 2005), available at <http://news.cnet.co.uklsoftware/
0,39029694,39190155,00.htm> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
21 Hiawatha Bray, BC Warns Its Alumni of Possible ID Theft After Computer Is
Hacked, Boston Globe E3 (Mar 17, 2005), available at <http://www.boston.com/business/
technology/articles/2005/03/17/bcwarns its alumniof-possibleid theftaftercomputer
is-hackedl> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
22 See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, available at
<http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm> (last visited Apr 15, 2008)
(showing large and consistent data breaches between Jan 2005 and Apr 13, 2008, the
date of the most recent update).
23 Mark Ward, Amazon's Old Customers 'Pay More", BBC News (Sept 8, 2000), avail-
able at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hifbusiness/914691.stm.> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
24 For more on price discrimination for information goods, see William W. Fisher III,
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Just as data mining could facilitate price discrimination for
Amazon or other online retailers, it operates in the tangible
world as well. For example, as a shopper uses a loyal-customer
card, certain discounts are offered at the register, personalized to
that customer. Soon, the price of a loaf of bread at the store may
become indeterminate: there is a sticker price, but when the
shopper takes the bread up front, the store can announce a spe-
cial individualized discount based on her relationship with the
store. The sticker price then becomes only that, providing little
indication of the price that shoppers are actually paying. Mer-
chants can also vary the level of service they provide. Customer
cards augmented with RFID tags can serve to identify those un-
desirable customers who visit a home improvement store, mo-
nopolize the attention of the attendants, and exit without having
bought so much as a single nail. With these kinds of cards, the
store would be able to discern the "good" (profitable) customers
from the "bad" (not profitable) ones and appropriately alert the
staff to flee from bad customers and approach good ones. (Bad
customers may then share their negative experiences with oth-
ers, and it might ultimately behoove the store to be more explicit
about what kinds of customers get what kinds of service when
differentiation takes place.)
II. PRIVACY 2.0
While privacy issues associated with government and corpo-
rate databases remain important, they are increasingly dwarfed
by threats to privacy that do not fit the standard analytical tem-
plate for addressing privacy threats. These new threats fit the
generative pattern also found in the technical layers for internet
and PC security, and in the content layer for ventures such as
Wikipedia. The emerging threats to privacy serve as an example
of generativity's downsides on the social layer, where contribu-
tions from many corners can enable vulnerability and abuse that
calls for intervention. Ideally such intervention would not unduly
dampen the underlying generativity. Effective solutions for the
problems of Privacy 2.0 have more in common with solutions to
other generative problems than with the remedies associated
with the decades-old analytic template for Privacy 1.0.
When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L Rev 1 (2007).
[2008:
PRIVACY2.0
A. The Era of Cheap Sensors
We can identify three successive shifts in technology from
the early 1970s: cheap processors, cheap networks, and cheap
sensors. 25 The third shift has, with the help of the first two,
opened the doors to new and formidable privacy invasions.
The first shift was cheap processors. Moore's Law observes
that processing power doubles every two years or so. 26 A corol-
lary is that existing processing power gets cheaper. The cheap
processors available since the 1970s have allowed Bill Gates's
vision of a "computer on every desk and in every home" to be re-
alized.27 Cheap processors also underlie information appliances:
thanks to Moore's Law, there are now sophisticated microproces-
sors in cars, coffeemakers, and singing greeting cards.
Cheap networks soon followed. The pay-per-minute proprie-
tary dial-up networks gave way to an internet of increasing
bandwidth and dropping price. The all-you-can-eat models of
measurement meant that, once established, idle network connec-
tions were no cheaper than well-used ones, and a web page in
New York cost no more to access from London than one in Paris.
Lacking gatekeepers, these inexpensive processors and networks
have been fertile soil for whimsical invention to take place and
become mainstream. 28 This generativity has arisen in part be-
cause the ancillary costs to experiment-both for software au-
thors and software users-have been so low.
The most recent technological shift has been the availability
of cheap sensors: the equipment that translates a phenomenon
from the real world into bits. Today's cameras, microphones,
scanners, and global positioning systems have small, accurate,
and inexpensive sensors. These characteristics have made sen-
sors much easier to deploy-and then network-in places where
previously it would have been impractical to have them.
25 See Paul Saffo, Sensors: The Next Wave of Infotech Innovation, available at
<http://www.saffo.comlessays/sensors.php> (last visited Feb 21, 2008) (identifying the
progression from the "processing decade" to today's internet network revolution, and
arguing that sensors will be the next wave in information technology).
26 See Intel, Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore's Law, avail-
able at <http://download.intel.com/museumlMoores-Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts-A
Conversation withGordonMoore.pdf> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
27 See Microsoft's Tradition of Innovation: From Revolution to Evolution (Microsoft
Oct 25, 2002), available at <http://www.microsoft.com/About/CompanyInformation/
ourbusinesseslprofile.mspx> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
28 See Zittrain, The Future of the Internet at 87-91 (cited in note 1) (discussing the
ways in which generative platforms foster contributions from amateur sources that find
value in markets, where traditional firms would fail to make such contributions).
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The proliferation of cheap surveillance cameras has empow-
ered the central authorities found within the traditional privacy
equation - government regulators. A 2002 working paper esti-
mated that the British government had spent $100 million on
closed-circuit television systems, with many networked to central
law enforcement stations for monitoring. 29 Such advances, and
the analysis that follows them, fit the template of Privacy 1.0:
governments gain access to more information thanks to more
widely deployed monitoring technologies, then rules and prac-
tices are suggested to prevent whatever our notions might be of
abuse. To see how cheap processors, networks, and sensors cre-
ate an entirely new form of problem, we must look to the excite-
ment surrounding the participatory technologies suggested by
one meaning of "Web 2.0." In academic circles, this meaning of
Web 2.0 has become known as "peer production."
B. The Dynamics of Peer Production
The aggregation of small contributions of individual work
can make once-difficult tasks seem easy. For example, Yochai
Benkler has approvingly described the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's ("NASA's") use of public volunteers, or
"clickworkers."30 NASA had a tedious job involving pictures of
craters from the moon and Mars. These were standard bitmap
images, and they wanted the craters to be vectorized: in other
words, they wanted people to draw circles around the craters
they saw in the photos. Writing some custom software and de-
ploying it online, NASA asked internet users at large to under-
take the task. Much to NASA's pleasant surprise, the volunteer
clickworkers accomplished in a week what a single graduate stu-
dent would have needed a year to complete. 31 Cheap networks
and PCs, coupled with the generative ability to costlessly offer
29 Michael McCahill and Clive Norris, Working Paper No 6, CCTV in London (Urban
Eye Project 2002), available at <http://www.urbaneye.net/results/ue-wp6.pdf> (last vis-
ited Feb 21, 2008).
30 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Mar-
kets and Freedom 69 (Yale 2006), available at <www.benkler.orgfBenklerWealth_
OfNetworks.pdf> (last visited Feb 21, 2008). More information on the original project's
results and further efforts is available at the clickworkers website. See
<http://clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/top> (last visited Feb 21, 2008).
31 See Benkler, Wealth of Networks at 69 (cited in note 30) (describing the success of
"an experiment to see if public volunteers, each working for a few minutes here and there
can do some routine science analysis that would normally be done by a scientist or gradu-
ate student working for months on end").
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new code for others to run, meant that those who wanted to pitch
in to help NASA could do so.
The near-costless aggregation of far-flung work can be ap-
plied in contexts other than the drawing of circles around cra-
ters, or the production of a free encyclopedia like Wikipedia.
Computer scientist Luis von Ahn, after noting that over nine bil-
lion person-hours were spent playing Windows Solitaire in a sin-
gle year, devised the online "ESP" game, in which two remote
players are randomly paired and shown an image. They are
asked to guess the word that best describes the image, and when
they each guess the same word they win points. 32 Their actions
also provide input to a database that reliably labels images for
use in graphical search engines, improving the performance of
image search engines. In real time, then, people are building and
participating in a collective, organic, world-wide computer to per-
form tasks that real computers cannot easily do themselves. 33
These kinds of grid applications produce (or at least encour-
age) certain kinds of public activity by combining small, individ-
ual private actions. Benkler calls this phenomenon "coordinate
coexistence producing information."34 Benkler points out that the
same idea helps us find what we are looking for on the internet,
even if we are not using a graphical search engine enhanced by
the ESP game; search engines commonly aggregate the artifacts
of individual internet activity, such as webmasters' choices about
where to link, to produce relevant search results.
The value of this human-derived wisdom has been exploited
by spammers, who create "link farms" of fake websites contain-
ing fragments of text drawn at random from elsewhere on the
Web ("word salad") that link back to the spammers' sites in an
attempt to boost their search engine rankings. The idea is that
these fake websites will be mistaken by search engine crawlers
as real ones, and the search engines will rank higher those sites
that are frequently linked to by other site. The most valuable
links are ones placed on truly popular websites, however, and the
32 Luis von Ahn, Human Computation, (Google TechTalk Jul 26, 2006), available at
<http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8246463980976635143> (last visited Feb 21,
2008).
33 See, for example, Benkler, Wealth of Networks at 81 (cited in note 30) (discussing
the potential for digital proofreading).
34 Id at 33 (cited in note 30). See also Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 Hast-
ings Commun & Enter L J 1, 39-50 (2004) (examining the concept of public activity de-
rived from compiling private activity in the context of online media sharing and peer-to-
peer networks).
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piles of inter-linked "word salad" among fake, computer-
generated websites do not fully trick the search engines.
As a result, spammers have turned to leaving comments on
popular blogs that ignore the original entry to which they are
attached and instead simply provide links back to their own web-
sites. In response, the authors of blogging software have incorpo-
rated so-called CAPTCHA35 boxes that must be navigated before
anyone can leave a comment on a blog. CAPTCHAs-now used
on many mainstream websites including Ticketmaster.com-ask
users to prove that they are human by typing in, say, a distorted
nonsense word displayed in a small graphic. 36 Computers can
start with a word and make a distorted image in a heartbeat, but
they cannot easily reverse engineer the distorted image back to
the word. This need for human intervention was intended to
force spammers to abandon automated robots to place their blog
comment spam. For a while they did, reportedly setting up
CAPTCHA sweatshops that paid people to solve CAPTCHAs
from blog comment prompts all day long. 37 (In 2003, the going
rate was $2.50/hour for such work.) 38 But spammers have con-
tinued to explore more efficient solutions. A spammer can write a
program to fill in all the information but the CAPTCHA, and
when it gets to the CAPTCHA it places it in front of a real person
trying to get to a piece of information-say on a page a user
might get after clicking a link that says, "You've just won $1000!
Click here!"39-or perhaps a pornographic photo. 40  The
35 CAPTCHA is an acronym for "Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
Computers and Humans Apart."
36 For a detailed discussion of CAPTCHAs, see Luis von Ahn, et al, CAPTCHA: Using
Hard AI Problems for Security, available at <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-biglou/CAPTCHA_
crypt.pd> (last visited Feb 22, 2008). See also Ticketmaster v RMG, 507 F Supp 2d 1096
(C D Cal 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction on the basis of copyright infringement
against a software developer whose automated tool was used to bypass the plaintiff's
CAPTCHAs).
37 For a detailed discussion of CAPTCHAs, spammers' workarounds, and human
computation, see von Ahn, Human Computation (cited in note 32); Luis von Ahn,
CAPTCHA, the ESP Game, and Other Stuff, available at <http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-biglou/
cycles.ppt> (last visited Feb 22, 2008) (accompanying slides for Human Computation).
38 von Ahn, CAPTCHA, the ESP Game, and Other Stuff, slide 27 (cited in note 37).
39 Email from Luis von Ahn to Jonathan Zittrain (May 22, 2007) (on file with author)
(describing an email informing the recipient that she had won $1,000 and prompting her
to click a link to a page that asked her to solve a CAPTCHA in order to claim her prize).
40 The use of pornography in motivating individuals to fill in CAPTCHAs has been
suggested but not proven. See The Official CAPTCHA Site, available at
<http://www.CAPTCHA.net/> (last visited Feb 22, 2008) ('flt might be the case that
some spammers use porn sites to attack CAPTCHAs.'). See also PC Stripper Helps Spain
to Spread, (BBC News Oct 30, 2007), available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/
7067962.stm> (last visited March 25, 2008).
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CAPTCHA is copied that instant from a blog where a spammer's
robot is waiting to leave a comment, and then pasted into the
prompt for the human wanting to see the next page. The hu-
man's answer to the CAPTCHA is then instantly ported back
over to the blog site in order to solve the CAPTCHA and leave
the spammed comment. 41 Predictably, companies have also
sprung up to meet this demand, providing custom software to
thwart CAPTCHAs on a contract basis of $100 to $5,000 per pro-
ject.42 Generative indeed: the ability to remix different pieces of
the Web, and to deploy new code without gatekeepers, is crucial
to the spammers' work. Other uses of CAPTCHAs are more be-
nign but equally subtle: a project called reCAPTCHA provides an
open application programming interface ("API") to substitute for
regular CAPTCHAs where a website might want to test to see if
it is a human visiting. 43 reCAPTCHA creates an image that pairs
a standard, automatically generated test word image with an
image of a word from an old book that a computer has been un-
able to properly scan and translate. 44 When the user solves the
CAPTCHA by entering both words, the first word is used to vali-
date that the user is indeed human, and the second is used to put
the human's computing power to work to identify one more word
of one more book that otherwise would be unscannable. 45
C. Peer Production and Privacy 2.0
What do CAPTCHAs have to do with privacy? New genera-
tive uses of the internet have made the solutions proposed for
Privacy 1.0 largely inapplicable. Fears about "mass dataveil-
lance" 46 are not misplaced, but they recognize only part of the
problem, and one that represents an increasingly smaller slice of
41 See von Ahn, Human Computation (cited in note 32).
42 See Brad Stone, Captchas, Online Gatekeepers Against Spain, Need an Overhaul,
(Intl Herald Trib Jun 11, 2007), available at <http://www.iht.comlarticles/
2007/06/11/businesscodes.php> (last visited Jan 11, 2008).
43 See Ben Maurer, reCAPTCHA: A New Way to Fight Spain, (May 23, 2007) avail-
able at <http:/Ibmaurer.blogspot.com/2007/05/reCAPTCHA-new-way-to-fight-spam.html>
(last visited Feb 22, 2008).
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious
Age 23 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The Naked Crowd: Balancing Privacy and Security in an
Age of Terror, 46 Ariz L Rev 607, 610 (2004) ("[lit was proposed after September 11 to
engage in ambitious forms of what Roger Clarke has called 'mass dataveillance' to con-
solidate and analyze public and private data in the hope of unearthing unusual patterns
that might predict suspicious activity.').
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the pie. Solutions such as disclosure 47 or encryption 48 still work
for Privacy 1.0, but new approaches are needed to match the
challenge of Privacy 2.0, in which sensitive data is collected and
exchanged peer to peer in configurations as unusual as that of
the spammers' system for bypassing CAPTCHAs.
The power of centralized databases feared in 1973 is now be-
ing replicated and amplified through generative uses of individ-
ual data and activity. For example, cheap sensors have allowed
various gunshot-detecting technologies to operate through mi-
crophones in public spaces. 49 If a shot is fired, sensors associated
with the microphones triangulate the shot's location and sum-
mon the police. To avoid false alarms, the system can be aug-
mented with help from the public at large, minimizing the need
for understaffed police to make the initial assessment about
what is going on when a suspicious sound is heard. Interested
citizens can review camera feeds near a reported shot and press
a button if they see something strange happening on their com-
puter monitors. Should a citizen do so, other citizens can be
asked for verification. If the answer is yes, the police can be sent.
(Of course, little prevents the repurposing of general-purpose
microphones for other uses once the infrastructure is in place.)
In November of 2006, the state of Texas spent $210,000 to
set up eight webcams along the Mexico border as part of a pilot
program to solicit the public's help in reducing illegal immigra-
tion. 50 Webcam feeds were sent to a public website, and people
were invited to alert the police if they thought they saw suspi-
47 See, for example, Fred H. Cate, Privacy in the Information Age 113 (Brookings
1997) (proposing how notice could be used to protect privacy).
48 See, for example, Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in
America 172-73 (Random House 2000) (explaining how, with the help of encryption,
"individual internet users could come close to realizing Louis Brandeis and Samuel War-
ren's ideal" of privacy).
49 ShotSpotter is a company that offers some examples of this technology. See Shot-
Spotter, ShotSpotter Gunshot Location System (GLS) Overview, available at
<http://www.shotspotter.com/products/index.html> (last visited Feb 22, 2008) (providing
an overview of the company's products); Ethan Watters, ShotSpotter, Wired Magazine
146-52 (Apr 2007), available at <http://www.shotspotter.com/news/articles/2007/4%20-
%20April/Wired%2OMagazinelWired%2OArticle%2OEprint%204.10.07.pdf> (last visited
Feb 22, 2008) (discussing the use and effectiveness of this technology). See also ShotSpot-
ter, ShotSpotter in the News, available at <http://www.shotspotter.com/news/news.html>
(last visited Feb 22, 2008) (providing links to articles discussing the company and its
products).
50 Sig Christenson, Border Webcams Rack Up Millions of Hits in a Month, Express-
News San Antonio (Dec 10, 2006), available at <http://www.mysanantonio.coml




cious activity. During the month-long trial the website took in
just under 28 million hits. No doubt many were from the curious
rather than the helpful, but those wanting to volunteer came
forward, too. The site registered over 220,000 users, and those
users sent 13,000 e-mails to report suspicious activity. At three
o'clock in the morning one woman at her PC saw someone signal
a pickup truck on the webcam. She alerted police, who seized
over four hundred pounds of marijuana from the truck's occu-
pants after a high-speed chase. In separate incidents, a stolen
car was recovered, and twelve undocumented immigrants were
stopped. To some-especially state officials-this was a success
beyond any expectation; 51 to others it was a paltry result for such
an expensive investment. 52
Beyond any first-order success of stopping crime, some ob-
servers welcome involvement by members of the public as a
check on law enforcement surveillance. 53 Science fiction author
David Brin foresaw increased use of cameras and other sensors
by the government and adopted an if-you-can't-beat-them-join-
them approach to dealing with the privacy threat. He suggested
allowing ubiquitous surveillance so long as the watchers them-
selves were watched: live cameras could be installed in police
cars, station houses, and jails. According to Brin, everyone
watching everyone would lessen the likelihood of unobserved
government abuse. What the Rodney King video did for a single
incident 54---one that surely would have passed without major
public notice but for the amateur video capturing seemingly ex-
cessive force by arresting officers-Brin's proposal could do for
nearly all state activities. Of course, Brin's calculus does not ade-
quately account for the invasions of privacy that would take
place whenever random members of the public could watch, and
perhaps record, every interaction between citizens and authori-
51 Id ("[Sltate officials Sunday tout[ed] it as a success beyond anyone's dreams.").
52 AP, Texas Border Cam Test Catches 10 Illegal Immigrants, Chi Sun-Times (Jan 8,
2007) ("It seems to me that $20,000 per undocumented worker is a lot of money" (quoting
state representative Norma Chavez) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Editorial, Vir-
tual Wall a Real Bust That Didn't Come Cheap, San Antonio Express-News 6B (Jan 19,
2007) ("[Ihe results are in: The plan bombed.").
53 See David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose
Between Privacy and Freedom? 52-54, 149-78 (Addison-Wesley 1999).
54 See Neal Feigenson and Meghan A. Dunn, New Visual Technologies in Court:
Directions for Research, 27 L & Hum Behavior 109, 117 (2003) (discussing how recent
advances in visual technologies will affect legal decisionmaking, with reference to many
cases that have altered the way courtrooms incorporate new technologies, including the
first Rodney King trial, "in which the use of slow-motion and freeze-framing desensitized
jurors to the brutality of the beatings depicted in the original videotape").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
ties, especially since many of those interactions take place at
sensitive moments for the citizens. And ubiquitous surveillance
can lead to other problems. The Sheriffs Office of Anderson
County, Tennessee, introduced one of the first live "jailcams" in
the county, covering a little area in the jail where jailors sit and
keep an eye on everything-the center of the panopticon. The
Anderson County webcam was very Web 2.0: the website in-
cluded a chat room where visitors could meet others viewing it,
there was a guestbook to sign, and a link to syndicated advertis-
ing to help fund the webcam. However, some people began using
the webcam to make crank calls to jailors at key moments and
even, it is claimed, to coordinate the delivery of contraband. 55
The webcam was shut down. 56
This example suggests a critical difference between Privacy
1.0 and 2.0. If the government is controlling the observation,
then the government can pull the plug on such webcams if it
thinks they are not helpful, balancing whatever policy factors it
chooses. 57 Many scholars have considered the privacy problems
posed by cheap sensors and networks, but they focus on the situ-
ations where the sensors serve only government or corporate
masters. Daniel Solove, for instance, has written extensively on
emergent privacy concerns, but he has focused on the danger of
"digital dossiers" created by businesses and governments. 58
Likewise, Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff have written about how
small sensors will lead to "pervasive computing," but they worry
that the technology will be abused by coordinated entities like
55 Id (noting that Maricopa County, Arizona, also shut its camera down after losing a
lawsuit by inmates alleging abuse of their rights).
56 The Anderson County jailcam was discontinued as of Nov 27, 2006; the website no
longer discusses its removal. It was formerly accessible at <http://www.tnacso.net/
cont/jailcam.php>. See AP, Tenn. Jail Webcam Jeopardizes Security, Boston.com News
(Nov 25, 2006), available at <http://www.boston.com/news/odd/articles2006/11/25/
tennjail-webcamjeopardizes-security/> (last visited Feb 22, 2008). See also Christian
Bottorff, Internet Peek at Jail Life Could End Soon: Anderson County Sheriff Says Web-
cam Jeopardizes Security, Tennessean.com (Nov 24, 2006), available at <http://www.
earthcam.com/media/ecnews/articles/tennessean -ll-24-2006.pdf> (last visited Feb 22,
2008) ("After six years Anderson County Sheriff Paul White shut down the jail Webcam
citing safety concerns.").
57 In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the passing of the USA
PATRIOT Act, the government has been increasingly likely to take an active role in is-
sues of electronic surveillance. For an overview of surveillance law and its shifting usage
by the government, see Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72
Geo Wash L Rev 1264, 1278-92 (2004) (detailing electronic surveillance law leading up to
the USA PATRIOT Act).
58 See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the In-
formation Age 2-7, 13-26 (NYU 2004) (expressing concern about the collection of infor-
mation held in commercial databases, public records, and government files).
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shopping malls, and their prescriptions thus follow the pattern
established by Privacy 1.0.59 Their concerns are not misplaced,
but they represent an increasingly smaller part of the total pic-
ture. The essence of Privacy 2.0 is that government or corpora-
tions, or intermediaries, need not be the source of the surveil-
lance.
Peer-to-peer technologies can eliminate points of control and
gatekeeping from the transfer of personal data and information
just as they can for movies and music. The intellectual property
conflicts raised by the generative internet-where people can
still copy large amounts of copyrighted music without fear of re-
percussion-are rehearsals for the problems of Privacy 2.0.60 The
Rodney King beating was filmed not by a public camera, but by a
private one, and its novel use in 1991 is now commonplace. Many
private cameras, including camera-equipped mobile phones, fit
the generative mold as devices purchased for one purpose but
frequently used for another. The Rodney King video, however,
required news network attention to gain salience. Videos depict-
ing similar events today gain attention without the prior ap-
proval of an intermediary. 61 With cheap sensors, processors, and
networks, citizens can quickly distribute to anywhere in the
world what they capture in their backyard. Therefore, any activ-
ity is subject to recording and broadcast. Perform a search on a
video aggregation site like YouTube for "angry teacher" or "road
rage" and hundreds of videos turn up. The presence of documen-
tary evidence not only makes such incidents reviewable by the
public at large, but for, say, angry teachers it also creates the
possibility of getting fired or disciplined where there had not
been one before. Perhaps this is good: teachers are on notice that
59 See Kang and Cuff, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev at 134-42 (cited in note 15) (focusing
privacy concerns on mall surveillance).
60 The largest difference may arise from the fact that invasions of privacy implicate
the dignity of individuals rather than firms' profits, and thus there is no natural lobby to
organize against this personal intrusion.
61 See Good Morning America, Expert: LAPD Officers'Behavior Not Unreasonable: An
Expert Says LAPD Officers Likely Acted Within the Law in Restraining a Suspect, ABC
News (Nov 11, 2006), available at <http://abcnews.go.com/GMAlstory?id=2646425> (last
visited Feb 22, 2008) ("A videotape posted on the Web site Youtube.com shows Los Ange-
les police officers hitting 24-year-old William Cardenas during an arrest."); LA Police
Brutality Video, YouTube (posted by 3101010 on YouTube, Nov 10, 2006), available at
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7_gFJJXLv28> (last visited Feb 22, 2008) ("Video
footage of a police officer repeatedly striking a suspect in the face during an arrest three
months ago has triggered an FBI investigation after the video was posted on You-
Tube.com.").
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they must account for their behavior the way that police officers
must take responsibility for their own actions.
If so, it is not just officers and teachers: we are all on notice.
The famed "bus uncle" of Hong Kong upbraided a fellow bus pas-
senger who politely asked him to speak more quietly on his mo-
bile phone. 62 The mobile phone user learned an important lesson
in etiquette when a third person captured the argument and
then uploaded it to the internet, where 2 million people have
viewed one version of the exchange. 63 (Others have since created
derivative versions of the exchange, including karaoke and a
ringtone. 64) Weeks after the video was posted, the Bus Uncle was
beaten up in a targeted attack at the restaurant where he
worked. 65 In a similar incident, a woman's dog defecated on the
floor of a South Korean subway. She refused to clean it up, even
when offered a tissue-though she cleaned the dog-and left the
subway car at the next stop.66 The incident was captured on a
mobile phone camera and posted to the internet, where the
poster issued an all points bulletin seeking information about the
dog owner and her relatives and about where she worked. 67 She
was identified by others who had previously seen her and the
dog, and the resulting firestorm of criticism apparently caused
her to quit her job. 68
The summed outrage of many unrelated people viewing a
disembodied video may be disproportionate to whatever social
norm or law is violated within that video. Lives can be ruined
after momentary wrongs, even if merely misdemeanors. Teacher
behavior in a classroom, for example, is largely a matter of stan-
dards and norms rather than rules and laws. But the presence of
scrutiny, should anything unusual happen, can halt desirable
pedagogical risks if there is a chance those risks could be taken
62 Bus Uncle, (YouTube May 11, 2006), available at <http://www.youtube.comlwatch?
v=RSHziqJWYcM> (last visited July 21, 2008).
63 Id (showing 2,034,671 views and 1,277 comments as of July 21, 2008).
64 See Hong Kong's ' Bus Uncle"Beaten Up by Three Men, Channel NewsAsia (June 8,
2006), available at <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/storieseastasia/view/212671/1/
.html> (last visited Feb 22, 2008).
65 Id.
66 Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates into Test of the Internet's Power to
Shame, Wash Post D01 (July 7, 2005), available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR2005070601 9 53.html> (last visited Feb 22, 2008).
67 Id.




out of context, misconstrued, or become the subject of pillory by
those with perfect hindsight.
These phenomena affect students as well as teachers, regu-
lar citizens rather than just those in authority. And ridicule or
mere celebrity can be as chilling as outright disapprobation. In
November 2002 a Canadian teenager used his high school's video
camera to record himself swinging a golf ball retriever as though
it were a light saber from Star Wars. 69 By all accounts he was
doing it for his own amusement. The tape was not erased, and it
was found the following spring by someone else who shared it,
first with friends and then with the internet at large. Although
individuals want privacy for themselves, they will line up to see
the follies of others, and by 2006 the "Star Wars Kid" was esti-
mated to be the most popular word-of-mouth video on the inter-
net, with over 900 million cumulative views. 70 It has spawned
several parodies, including ones shown on prime time television.
This is a consummately generative event: a repurposing of some-
thing made for completely different reasons, taking off beyond
any expectation, and triggering further works, elaborations, and
commentaries-both by other amateurs and by Hollywood. 71 It is
also a privacy story. The student who made the video has been
reported to have been traumatized by its circulation, and in no
way did he seek to capitalize on his celebrity. 72
In this hyperscrutinized reality, people may moderate them-
selves instead of expressing their true opinions. To be sure, peo-
ple have always balanced between public and private expression.
As Mark Twain observed:
We are discreet sheep; we wait to see how the drove is go-
ing, and then go with the drove. We have two opinions:
69 For details on Star Wars Kid, see Wikipedia, Star Wars Kid, available at
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StarWars kid> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
70 Star Wars Kid Is Top Viral Video, BBC News (Nov 27, 2006), available at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/6187554.stm> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
71 See, for example, Heather Adler, Stephen Colbert Aims His Lightsaber at Star
Wars, Dose.ca (Aug 24, 2006), available at <http://www.dose.ca/celeb/
story.html?id=10261eb6-0469-4198-a16a-lf302275b2a9> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) (de-
scribing the Comedy Central show host's mocking of the Star Wars Kid); White & Nerdy
(Google Video, Sept 19, 2006), available at <http://video.google.com/videoplay?
docid=1384277706451157121> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) ("Weird Al" Yankovic's music
video from his album "Straight Outta Lynwood," which includes a scene imitating the
Star Wars Kid). For a list of other pop-culture references, see Wikipedia, Star Wars Kid
(cited in note 69).
72 See Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the
Internet 44-48 (Yale 2007).
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one private, which we are afraid to express; and another
one-the one we use-which we force ourselves to wear to
please Mrs. Grundy, until habit makes us comfortable in
it, and the custom of defending it presently makes us love
it, adore it, and forget how pitifully we came by it. Look at
it in politics. 73
Today we are all becoming politicians. People in power,
whether at parliamentary debates or press conferences, have
learned to stick to carefully planned talking points, accepting the
drawbacks of appearing stilted and saying little of substance in
exchange for the benefits of predictability and stability. 74 Ubiqui-
tous sensors threaten to push everyone toward treating each
public encounter as if it were a press conference, creating fewer
spaces in which citizens can express their private selves.
Even the use of "public" and "private" to describe our selves
and spaces is not subtle enough to express the kind of privacy we
might want. 75 By one definition they mean who manages the
space: a federal post office is public; a home is private. A typical
restaurant or inn is thus also private, yet it is also a place where
the public gathers and mingles: someone there is "in public." But
while activities in private establishments open to the public are
technically in the public eye, 76 what transpires there is usually
limited to a handful of eyewitnesses-likely strangers-and the
activity is ephemeral. No more, thanks to cheap sensors and
cheap networks to disseminate what they glean. As our previ-
ously private public spaces, like classrooms and restaurants, turn
73 Mark Twain, Volume II Mark Twain's Autobiography 10 (Harper 1924).
74 This was a lesson learned by George Allen, a Republican candidate in the 2006
U.S. Senate campaign who was caught on camera calling an Indian supporter of his op-
ponent by the derogatory epithet "macaca." Carl Hulse, Senator Apologizes to Student for
Remark, NY Times A20 (Aug 24, 2006), available at <http://www.nytimes.coml2006/08/
24/washingtorl24allen.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008). See also Dale Eisman, Others
Will Have "Macaca Moments," Pundits Say, Virginian-Pilot (Dec 1, 2006), available at
<http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/751673/others-will-havemacacamoments_p
unditssay/index.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) (noting the inevitability of another slip
caught on videotape as "hundreds of citizen activists, armed with cell-phone cameras
[are] ready to catch any awkward moment and misstatement to distribute it through
cyberspace.").
75 See Solove, The Future of Reputation, 7-9, 162-89 (cited in note 72).
76 Such places, while private, are sometimes treated by the law as places of "public
accommodation," in recognition of their hybrid status. This classification imposes some
responsibility on their owners for equal treatment of patrons. See 42 USC § 12181(7)
(2000) (defining a public accommodation as a restaurant and inn, among other things, for
purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 USC §§ 2000a(b)(1)-(2) (2000) (clas-
sifying inns and restaurants as places of public accommodations for the purposes of the
1964 Civil Rights Act).
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into public public spaces, the pressure will rise for us to always
be on press conference behavior.
There are both significant costs and benefits inherent in ex-
panding the use of our public selves into more facets of daily life.
Our public face may be kinder, and the expansion may cause us
to rethink our private prejudices and excesses as we publicly pro-
fess more mainstream standards and, as Twain says, "habit
makes us comfortable in it."77 On the other hand, as law profes-
sors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein point out, strong normative
pressure can prevent outlying behavior of any kind, and group
baselines can themselves be prejudiced.78 Outlying behavior is
the generative spark found at the social layer, the cultural inno-
vation out of left field that can later become mainstream. Our
information technology environment has benefited immeasurably
from experimentation by a variety of people with different aims,
motives, and skills. In the same way, our cultural environment is
bettered when commonly held and rarely revisited views can be
challenged.
The framers of the American Constitution embraced anony-
mous speech in the political sphere as a way of being able to ex-
press unpopular opinions without having to experience personal
disapprobation.7 9 No defense of a similar principle was needed
77 Twain, Volume II Mark Twain's Autobiography at 10 (cited in note 73).
78 See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan L Rev
131, 162 (2006) ('In a reputational cascade, people think that they know what is right, or
what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order to main-
tain the good opinion of others. Suppose that Albert suggests that global warming is a
serious problem and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she actually thinks
that Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert, to be ignorant or
indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree that global
warming is a serious problem, Cynthia might not contradict them publicly and might
even appear to share their judgment, not because she believes that judgment to be cor-
rect, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion. It
should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade."). New and unique ideas
can have important effects; for a general discussion, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping
Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (Back Bay 2000), but unless widely
held views are consistently challenged, incorrect ideas can become deeply ensconced. See
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 Stan L & Pol Rev 197, 210-11 (2006) ("[Slmall
or even large groups of people [can] end up believing something-even if that something
is false-simply because other people seem to believe it."). See also Irving L. Janis,
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Houghton Mifflin 2d
ed 1982) (discussing how group pressure can lead members to agree to a result that they
personally think is wrong).
79 See McIntyre v Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas con-
curring) ("There is little doubt that the Framers engaged in anonymous political writing.
The essays in the Federalist Papers, published under the pseudonym of 'Publius,' are only
the most famous example of the outpouring of anonymous political writing that occurred
during the ratification of the Constitution."); id at 361 (Scalia dissenting) ("[The histori-
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for keeping private conversations in public spaces from becoming
verbatim public broadcasts-disapprobation that begins with
small "test" groups but somehow becomes societywide-since
there were no means by which to perform that transformation.
Now that the means exist, a defense is called for lest we run the
risk of letting our social system become metaphorically more ap-
pliancized: open to change only by those few radicals so discon-
nected from existing norms as to not fear their imposition at all.
Privacy 2.0 is about more than those who are famous or
those who become involuntary "welebrities." For those who hap-
pen to be captured doing particularly fascinating or embarrass-
ing things, like Star Wars Kid or an angry teacher, a utilitarian
might say that 900 million views is first-order evidence of a pub-
lic benefit far exceeding the cost to the student who made the
video. It might even be pointed out that the Star Wars Kid failed
to erase the tape, so he can be said to bear some responsibility
for its circulation. But the next generation privacy problem can-
not be written off as affecting only a few unlucky victims. Nei-
ther can it be said to affect only genuine celebrities who must
now face constant exposure not only to a handful of professional
paparazzi but also to hordes of sensor-equipped amateurs. (Ce-
lebrities must now contend with the consequences of cell phone
video of their slightest aberrations-such as one in which a mild-
ly testy exchange with a valet parker is quickly circulated and
exaggerated online 80 -or more comprehensive peer-produced
sites like Gawker Stalker, where people send in local sightings of
celebrities as they happen.81 Gawker strives to relay the sight-
ings within fifteen minutes and place them upon a Google map,8 2
so that if Jack Nicholson is at Starbucks, one can arrive in time
to stand awkwardly near him before he finishes his latte.
"[O]n the Web, everyone will be famous to fifteen people. '8 3
Cybervisionary David Weinberger, in this twist on Andy War-
hol's famous quotation, posed the central issue for the rest of us.
Although Weinberger made his observation in the context of
cal evidence indicates that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that
anonymous authors reveal their identities on the ground that forced disclosure violated
the 'freedom of the press."').
80 See TMZ Staff, Elisha: The B*tch Next Door!, TMZ.com (Nov 14, 2006), available at
<http:lwww.tmz.con2006/l 1/14/elisha-the-b-tch-next-door/> (last visited Jan 15, 2008).
81 See <http://gawker.com/stalker/> (last visited June 1, 2007).
82 See id.




online expression, explaining that microaudiences are worthy
audiences, it has further application. Just as cheap networks
make it possible for businesses to satisfy the "long tail," serving
the needs of obscure interests every bit as much as popular
ones8 4 (Amazon.com is virtually able to stock a selection of books
far beyond the bestsellers found in a physical bookstore), peer-
produced databases can be configured to track the people who
are of interest only to a few others.
How will the next generation privacy problem affect average
citizens? Early photo aggregation sites like Flickr were premised
on a seemingly dubious assumption that turned out to be true:
not only would people want an online repository for their photos,
but they would often be pleased to share them with the public at
large. Such sites now boast hundreds of millions of photos,8 5
many of which are also sorted and categorized thanks to the
same distributed energy that got Mars's craters promptly
mapped. Proponents of Web 2.0 sing the praises of "folksono-
mies," bottom-up tagging done by strangers, in contrast to ex-
pert-designed and -applied canonical taxonomies like the Dewey
Decimal System or the Library of Congress schemes for sorting
books.8 6 Metadata describing the contents of pictures makes im-
ages far more useful and searchable. Combining user-generated
tags with automatically generated data makes pictures even
more accessible. Camera makers now routinely build cameras
that use the Global Positioning System to mark exactly where on
the planet each of the pictures it snaps was taken and, of course,
to time- and date-stamp them. Websites like Riya, Polar Rose,
and MyHeritage are perfecting facial recognition technologies so
that once photos of a particular person are tagged a few times
with his or her name, their computers can then automatically
label all future photos that include the person, even if their im-
84 Traditionally, retailers, television networks, and movie theaters were forced to try
to identify mainstream, popular choices. They had to favor middle-ground material be-
cause they had only a limited amount of shelf space, prime-time hours, or screens, respec-
tively, and needed to maximize their sales. Online marketplaces do not have that limita-
tion: "A hit and a miss are on equal economic footing, both just entries in a database
called up on demand, both equally worthy of being carried. Suddenly, popularity no
longer has a monopoly on profitability." Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, 12.10 Wired 2
(Oct 2004), available at <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/tail.html> (last vis-
ited Feb 23, 2008).
85 Flickr had more than 500 million photos as of May 2007. Email from Meagan Bu-
sath, public relations representative, Flickr, to Jonathan Zittrain (May 24, 2007, 15:17
EDT) (on file with author.
86 David Weinberger, Everything is Miscellaneous: The Power of the New Digital
Disorder 165-66 (Henry Holt 2007).
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age appears in the background.87 In August 2006 Google an-
nounced the acquisition of Neven Vision, a company working on
photo recognition, and in May 2007 Google added a feature to its
image search so that searchers can limit their search to images
of people (to be sure, this is still short of identifying which image
is which).88 Massachusetts officials have used such technology to
compare mug shots in 'Wanted" posters to driver's license pho-
tos, leading to arrests.8 9 Mash together these technologies and
functionalities through the kind of generative mixing allowed by
their open APIs and it becomes trivial to receive answers to
questions like: Where was Jonathan Zittrain last year on the
fourteenth of February? Or, who could be found near the en-
trance to the local Planned Parenthood clinic in the past six
months? The answers need not come from government or corpo-
rate cameras, which are at least partially secured against abuse
through well-considered privacy policies from Privacy 1.0. In-
stead, the answers come from a more powerful, generative
source: an army of the world's photographers, including tourists
sharing their photos online without firm (or legitimate) expecta-
tions of how they might next be used and re-used. 90
Those uses may be surprising or even offensive to those who
create the new tools or provide the underlying data. The Chris-
tian Gallery News Service was started by antiabortion activist
Neal Horsley in the mid 1990s. 91 Part of its activities included
the Nuremberg Files website, where the public was solicited for
87 Riya is a visual search engine that helps users find similar images. See About
Riya, <http://www.riya.comlabout> (last visited March 16, 2008). Polar Rose is a browser
plug-in that identifies people in public photographs on the Web. See Polar Rose,
<http://www.polarrose.com/> (last visited March 16, 2008). MyHeritage uses visual
searching technology to locate users' family members online. See About MyHeritage.com,
<http://www.myheritage.com/about-myheritage> (last visited March 16, 2008).
88 See Posting of Loren Baker to Search Engine Journal, Google, Neven Vision &
Image Recognition (Aug 15, 2006), available at <http://www.searchenginejournal.com/
google-neven-vision-image-recognition3728/> (last visited Feb 23, 2008); Jacqui Cheng,
Facial Recognition Slipped into Google Image Search, Ars Technica (May 30, 2007), avail-
able at <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070530-facial-recognition-slipped-into-
google-image-search.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
89 See Adam Liptak, Driver's License Emerges as Crime-Fighting Tool, but Privacy
Advocates Worry, NY Times A10 (Feb 17, 2007), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/02/17/us/17face.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
90 U.S. law generally does not provide a privacy right protecting those who are in
public from being photographed (or preventing the publication of resulting photographs).
See, for example, Gil v Hearst Publishing Co, 253 P2d 441, 444-45 (Cal 1953) (holding
that a couple photographed at their place of business at a public market had no cause of
action against the photograph's publisher).
91 See Christian Gallery News Service, available at <http://www.christiangallery.
com> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
[2008:
PRIVACY 2.0
as much information as possible about the identities, lives, and
families of physicians who performed abortions, as well as about
clinic owners and workers. 92 When a provider was killed, a line
would be drawn through his or her name. (The site was rarely
updated with new information, and it became entangled in a lar-
ger lawsuit lodged under the U.S. Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act.93 The site remains accessible.) An associated ven-
ture solicits the public to take pictures of women arriving at clin-
ics, including the cars in which they arrive (and corresponding
license plates), and posts the pictures in order to deter people
from nearing clinics. 94
With image recognition technology mash-ups, photos taken
as people enter clinics or participate in protests can be instantly
cross-referenced with their names. One can easily pair this type
of data with Google Maps to provide fine-grained satellite im-
agery of the homes and neighborhoods of these individuals, simi-
lar to the "subversive books" maps created by computer consult-
ant and tinkerer Tom Owad tracking wish lists on Ama-
zon.com.
95
This intrusion can reach places that the governments of lib-
eral democracies refuse to go. In early 2007, a federal court over-
seeing the settlement of a class action lawsuit over New York
City police surveillance of public activities held that routine po-
92 See The Nuremberg Files, available at <http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/>
(last visited Feb 23, 2008).
93 See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/ Willamette, Inc v American Coalition of Life
Activists, 422 F3d 949, 951-52 (9th Cir 2005) (modifying the jury verdict against the
American Coalition of Life Activists for their "campaign of terror and intimidation,"
which included operating the Nuremberg Files website).
94 See Abortion Cams: 3hame Deters Abortion, available at <http://www.
abortioncams.com> (last visited Feb 23, 2008). The website is premised on the belief that
showing the images of clinic patients will either shame or scare women away from having
an abortion. See How to Deter Abortion, available at <http://www.abortioncams.
com/deter.htm> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) ("Would a preacher want to be photographed
going into a whore house, would a Priest want to be photographed going into a sex chat
room with grade school kids? Neither would a mother want to be photographed going in
to kill her baby.").
95 See Posting of Tom Owad to Applefritter, Data Mining 101: Finding Subversives
Within Amazon Wishlists, available at <http://www.applefritter.combannedbooks> (sub-
mitted Jan 4 2006) (last visited Feb 23, 2008). See also Paul Marks, "Mashup" Websites
Are a Dream Come True for Hackers, 2551 New Scientist 28 (May 12, 2006), available at
<http://www.newscientisttech.com/channel/tech/electronic-threats/mgl9025516.400-
mashup-websites-are-a-hackers-dream-come-true.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) ("Ma-
shups ... are created by merging data from two or more websites ... Mashups merge
location-based information with other online sources to create an application that
amounts to more than the sum of its parts. For instance, www.chicagocrime.org combines
Google Local's maps with Chicago's crime database, pinpointing the city's crime hot-
spots.").
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lice videotaping of public events was in violation of the settle-
ment:
The authority ... conferred upon the NYPD "to visit any
place and attend any event that is open to the public, on
the same terms and conditions of the public generally,"
cannot be stretched to authorize police officers to video-
tape everyone at a public gathering just because a visiting
little old lady from Dubuque ... could do so. There is a
quantum difference between a police officer and the little
old lady (or other tourist or private citizen) videotaping or
photographing a public event.96
The court expressed concern about a chilling of speech and
political activities if authorities were videotaping public events.
But police surveillance becomes moot when an army of little old
ladies from Dubuque is naturally videotaping and sharing nearly
everything: protests, scenes inside a mall (such that amateur
video exists of a random shootout in a Salt Lake City, Utah,
mall),97 or picnics in the park. Peer-leveraging technologies are
overstepping the boundaries that laws and norms have defined
as public and private, even as they are also facilitating beneficial
innovation. Cheap processors, networks, and sensors enable a
new form of beneficial information flow as citizen reporters can
provide footage and front line analysis of newsworthy events as
they happen. 98 For example, OhmyNews is a wildly popular on-
line newspaper in South Korea with citizen-written articles and
reports. (Such writers provide editors with their national identity
number so articles are not fully anonymous.) Similarly, those
who might commit atrocities within war zones can now be sur-
veilled and recorded by civilians so that their actions may be
watched and ultimately punished, a potential sea change for the
protection of human rights.99
96 Handschu v Special Service Division, No 71 Civ 2203 (S D NY Feb 15, 2007), avail-
able at <http://graphics.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20070215_nycruling.pdf>
(last visited Feb 23, 2008).
97 See Home Video: Utah Mall Shooting, FOX News (Feb 16, 2007), available at
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252395,00.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
98 See AFP, Internet Users Transformed into News Reporters, Breitbart.com (Feb 11,
2007), available at <http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=070211104154.4keqosqw&
show-article=l> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) ("You have tens of millions of people around
the world with cell phones with cameras connected to providers. It's like having an army
of stringers out." (quoting Scott Moore, head of Yahoo News)).
99 Witness.org was founded with the idea that it would be easier to bring perpetrators
to justice if there was photographic or video evidence of their crimes. Its mission is to use
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For privacy, peer-leveraging technologies might make for a
much more constrained world rather than the more chaotic one
that they have wrought for intellectual property. More precisely,
a world where bits can be recorded, manipulated, and transmit-
ted without limitation means, in copyright, a free-for-all for the
public and constraint upon firms (and perhaps upstream artists)
with content to protect. For privacy, the public is variously crea-
tor, beneficiary, and victim of the free-for-all. The constraints-in
the form of privacy invasion that Jeffrey Rosen crystallizes as an
"unwanted gaze" 00-now come not only from the well-organized
governments or firms of Privacy 1.0, but from a few people gen-
eratively drawing upon the labors of many to greatly impact
rights otherwise guaranteed by a legal system.
III. PRIVACY AND REPUTATION
At each layer where a generative pattern can be discerned,
we can ask whether there is a way to sift out what we might
judge to be bad generative results from the good ones without
unduly damaging the system's overall generativity. This is a
question raised at the technical layer for network security, at the
content layer for falsehoods in Wikipedia and failures of intellec-
tual property protection, and now at the social layer for pri-
vacy. 101 Can we preserve generative innovations without giving
up our core privacy values? Before turning to answers, it is help-
ful to explore a final piece of the Privacy 2.0 mosaic: the impact
of emerging reputation systems. This is both because such sys-
tems can greatly impact our privacy 10 2 and because reputational
tools may help solve the generative sifting problem at other lay-
ers.
"video and online technologies to open the eyes of the world to human rights violations."
See <http://witness.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id=26&Itemid=78>
last visited Feb 23, 2008).
100 See Rosen, Unwanted Gaze (cited in note 48).
101 See Zittrain, The Future of the Internet at 64 (cited in note 1).
102 Consider Solove, The Future of Reputation (cited in note 72).
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Search is central to a functioning Web, 103 and reputation has
become central to search. If people already know exactly what
they are looking for, a network needs only a way of registering
and indexing specific sites. Thus, IP addresses are attached to
computers, and domain names to IP addresses, so that we can
ask for www.cnn.com and go straight there. But much of the time
we want help in finding something without knowing the exact
online destination. Search engines help us navigate the peta-
bytes of publicly posted information online, and for them to work
well they must do more than simply identify all pages containing
the search terms that we specify. They must rank them in rele-
vance.
There are many ways to identify what sites are most rele-
vant. A handful of search engines auction off the top-ranked slots
in search results on given terms and determine relevance on the
basis of how much the site operators would pay to put their sites
in front of searchers. 10 4 These search engines are not widely
used. 105 Most have instead turned to some proxy for reputation.
103 Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 Yale J
L & Tech 201, 202 (2006) ("Since the creation of the first pre-Web Internet search engines
in the early 1990s, search engines have become almost as important as email as a pri-
mary online activity. Arguably, search engines are among the most important gatekeep-
ers in today's digitally networked environment."); Stephen E. Arnold, Google: Search
Becomes an Application Platform 1 (2005) (unpublished position paper, on file with the U
Chi Legal F) ("Just as calculations were one of the reasons for mainframes, search is one
of the reasons why distributed, parallel, commodity-based network systems as the next
computing platforms. The smartphone, the desktop computer, the Xbox game machine,
and even the mainframe gain greater utility when linked to a computer similar to one
built, owned, and operated by Google."); Memorandum from Deborah Fallows et al, Pew
Internet & American Life Project, The popularity and importance of Search Engines 3
(Aug 2004), available at <http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPDataMemo-
Searchengines.pdf> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) ('The availability of reliable, easy-to-use
search engines has transformed people's connection to information. For some, search
engines are indispensable. Many people deeply rely on search engines to deliver vitally
important information to them: 44% of searchers say that all or most of the searches they
conduct are for information they absolutely need to find.").
104 Pay-for-placement has existed from the early days of the Web's commercialization.
See Jeff Pelline, Pay-for-Placement Gets Another Shot, CNET News.com (Feb 19, 1998),
available at <http://news.com.com/Pay-for-placement+gets+another+shot/2100-1023_3-
208309.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) (noting renewed attempts to establish pay-for-
placement search engines in 1998). Until early 2007, Yahoo's search engine placed the
highest bidders' ads before the most relevant ads. Yahoo, however, switched to ranking
based on relevance only, a change driven by significant competitive pressures. See Sara
Kehaulani Goo, Yahoo Retools Ad Technology; Ranking System Ends Pay-for-Placement
Ads in Search Results, Wash Post D2 (Feb 6, 2007), ('The whole notion that I can buy my
way to the top [of sponsored links] is something we do want to move beyond" (quoting Tim
Cadogan, Vice President, Yahoo Search Marketing) (interpolation in original)). Of course,
advertisers routinely pay for placement among sets of sponsored links included alongside
search results in search engines like Yahoo and Google.
105 See Hitslink, Search Engine Market Share for January 2008, available at
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As mentioned earlier, a site popular with others-with lots of
inbound links-is considered worthier of a high rank than an
unpopular one, and thus search engines can draw upon the be-
havior of millions of other websites as they sort their search re-
suits.1 06 Sites like Amazon.com deploy a different form of rank-
ing, using the "mouse droppings" of customer purchasing and
browsing behavior to make recommendations-so they can iden-
tify for customers that "people who like the Beatles also like the
Rolling Stones." 10 7 Search engines can also more explicitly invite
the public to express its views on the items it ranks, so that users
can decide what to view or buy on the basis of others' opinions.
Amazon users can rate and review the items for sale, and subse-
quent users then rate the first users' reviews. Sites like Digg and
Reddit invite users to vote for stories and articles they like, and
tech news site Slashdot employs a rating system so complex that
it attracts much academic attention. 108
eBay uses reputation to help shoppers find trustworthy sell-
ers. eBay users rate each others' transactions, and this trail of
ratings then informs future buyers how much to trust repeat sel-
lers. These rating systems are crude but powerful. Malicious
sellers can abandon poorly rated eBay accounts and sign up for
new ones, but fresh accounts with little track record are often
viewed skeptically by buyers, especially for proposed transac-
tions involving expensive items. One study confirmed that estab-
lished identities fare better than new ones, with buyers willing to
pay, on average, over eight percent more for items sold by highly
regarded, established sellers. 10 9 Reputation systems have many
pitfalls and can be gamed, but the scholarship seems to indicate
that they work reasonably well." 0 There are many ways reputa-
<http://marketshare.hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=4> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) (find-
ing that Google and Yahoo! together enjoy nearly 90 percent market share).
106 Benkler, Wealth of Networks 76 (cited in note 30) ('More fundamentally, the core
innovation of Google, widely recognized as the most efficient general search engine during
the first half of the 2000s, was to introduce peer-based judgments of relevance.... The
engine treats links from other Web sites pointing to a given Web site as votes of confi-
dence.').
107 A New York state legislator recently proposed a new law that would limit some
online companies' ability to track such mouse droppings. See Louise Story, A Push To
Limit the Tracking of Web Surfer's Clicks, NY Times C3 (March 20, 2008).
108 Benkler, Wealth of Networks at 76-80 (cited in note 30) (describing the peer rating
systems of various websites).
109 See Paul Resnick, et al, The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment,
9 Experimental Econ 79, 96 (2006) ("[B]uyers are willing to pay 8.1% more for lots sold by
STRONG [reputation sellers] than NEW [sellers].").
110 See, for example, Paul Resnick, et al, Reputation Systems: Facilitating Trust in
Internet Interactions, 43(12) Commun ACM 45, 46 (Dec 2000) (noting that reputation
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tion systems might be improved, but at their core they rely on
the fact that the number of people rating each other in good faith
probably well exceeds the number of people seeking to game the
system-and a way to exclude robots working for the latter. For
example, eBay's rating system has been threatened by the rise of
"l-cent eBooks" with no shipping charges; sellers can create alter
egos to bid on these non-items and then have the phantom users
highly rate the transaction.111 One such "feedback farm" earned
a seller a thousand positive reviews over four days. eBay inter-
venes to some extent to eliminate such gaming, just as Google
reserves the right to exact the "Google death penalty" by de-
listing any website that it believes is unduly gaming its chances
of a high search engine rating. 112
These reputation systems now stand to expand beyond
evaluating people's behavior in discrete transactions or making
recommendations on products or content, into rating people more
generally. This could happen as an extension of current services:
one's eBay rating could be used to determine trustworthiness on,
say, another peer-to-peer service. Any downside to allowing its
ratings to be deployed elsewhere (such as on competing auction
sites), could be significantly outweighed by the benefits of serv-
ing as an authoritative purveyor of reputation information. Or,
trustworthiness ratings could come directly from social network-
ing: Cyworld is a social networking site that has twenty million
subscribers; it is one of the most popular internet services in the
systems protect anonymity while fostering reliable transactions); Paul Resnick and Rich-
ard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of
eBay's Reputation System, 11 Advances Applied Microecon 127 (2002), available at
<http://www.si.umich.edu/-presnick/papers/ebayNBER/RZNBERBodegaBay.pdf> (last
visited Feb 23, 2008) (noting that eBay's system and others appear to work, probably with
help from norms drawn from outside the online context); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, The
Digitization of Word-of-Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback, 49 Mgmt Sci
1407, 1418-21 (2003) (noting several ways that users can game the system, including
changing their user name after receiving a bad rating).
111 Ina Steiner, eBay "Feedback Farms" Planted with One-Cent eBooks, Auction-
Bytes.com (Oct 3, 2006), available at <http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y06/
mlO/i03/s02> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
112 For example, at one point Google de-listed BMW for creating dummy web pages
with key words in order to raise the ranking of its central website. See BMW Given
Google "Death Penalty" BBC News (Feb 6, 2006), available at <http://news.bbc.co.ukl
2/hiltechnology/4685750.stm> (last visited Feb 23, 2008). Google, however, quickly
showed mercy and re-listed the site just three days later, casting some doubt on the effec-
tiveness of the system when the perpetrator is an influential and important website. See
Danny Sullivan, Welcome Back to Google, BMW-Missed You These Past Three Days,
SearchEngineWatch.com (Feb 8, 2006), available at <http:/blog.searchenginewatch.coml
blog060208-104027> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
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world, largely thanks to interest in South Korea. 113 The site has
its own economy, with about $100 million worth of "acorns," Cy-
world's currency, sold in 2006.114
Not only does Cyworld have a financial market, but it also
has a market for reputation. Cyworld includes rating and behav-
ior monitoring systems that make it so that users can see a con-
stantly updated score for "sexiness," "fame," "friendliness,"
"karma," and "kindness." As people interact with each other,
they try to maximize the kinds of behaviors that augment their
ratings in the same way that many websites try to figure out how
best to optimize their presentation for a high Google ranking.11 5
People's worth is defined and measured precisely, if not accu-
rately, by the reactions of others. That trend is increasing as so-
cial networking takes off, partly due to the extension of online
social networks beyond the people a user already knows person-
ally as they "befriend" their friends' friends' friends.
The whole-person ratings of social networks like Cyworld
will eventually be available in the real world. Similar real world
reputation systems already exist in embryonic form. Law profes-
sor Lior Strahilevitz has written a fascinating monograph on the
effectiveness of "How's My Driving" programs, where commercial
vehicles are emblazoned with bumper stickers encouraging other
drivers to report poor driving.1 16 He notes that such programs
have resulted in significant accident reductions, and analyzes
113 Cyworld allows its users to decorate their pages by renting various digital accou-
trements. While one's home page has the metaphor of a physical home, every digital item
within the home is rented rather than purchased. See Deborah Cameron, Koreans Cyber-
trip to a Tailor-Made World, The Age (May 9, 2005), available at <http://www.theage.
com.au/articles/2005/05/06/1i5092684512.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) ("Instead of
real money the Cyworld currency is dotori, which is Korean for acorn. An acorn costs 100
won (about 12 cents) ... Something small from the online shop might cost three acorns
but a more average purchase costs 10 acorns and something elaborate might set him back
20 acorns. The 'rent' for some items has to be paid each month or they disappear."). This
reasoning might similarly apply to Second Life, another popular Internet-based virtual
world.
114 Cho Jin-seo, Cyworld Members Reach 20 Mil., Korea Times (Feb 5, 2007), available
at <http://search.hankooki.com/times/times-view.php?term=cyworld++&path=hankooki3/
times/lpage/tech/200702/kt2007O2O519364411810.htm&media=kt> (last visited Feb 23,
2008) (stating sales of "100 billion won" in 2006, converting to approximately $100 mil-
lion).
115 See Jennifer Park, "7 Was a Cyholic, a Cyworld Addict," OhmyNews (July 26,
2004), available at <http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article-view.asp?menu=
c10400&no=179108&rel-no=l&back~url> (last visited Feb 23, 2008) (noting the incentive
to buy decorations for your virtual room in hopes of increasing ratings such as "popular-
ity" and "fame").
116 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, "How's My Driving?" for Everyone (and Everything?),
81 NYU L Rev 1699 (2006).
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what might happen if the program were extended to all driv-
ers. 117 A technologically sophisticated version of the scheme dis-
penses with the need to note a phone number and file a report;
one could instead install transponders in every vehicle and dis-
tribute TiVo-like remote controls with "thumbs up" and "thumbs
down" ratings buttons to drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians. If
someone acts politely, say by allowing you to switch lanes, you
can acknowledge such politeness with a digital thumbs-up that is
recorded on that driver's record. Cutting someone off in traffic
earns a thumbs-down from the victim and other witnesses. Stra-
hilevitz is supportive of such a scheme, and he surmises it could
be even more effective than eBay's ratings for online transactions
since vehicles are registered by the government, making it far
more difficult to escape poor ratings tied to one's vehicle. He ac-
knowledges some worries: people could give thumbs-down to
each other for reasons unrelated to their driving-racism, for
example. Perhaps a bumper sticker expressing support for Re-
publicans would earn a thumbs-down in a blue state. Strahilevitz
counters that the reputation system could be made to eliminate
"outliers," so presumably only well-ensconced racism across
many drivers would end up affecting one's ratings. According to
Strahilevitz, this system of peer judgment would pass constitu-
tional muster if challenged, even if the program is run by the
state, because driving does not implicate one's core rights. "How's
My Driving?" systems are too minor to warrant extensive judicial
review. But driving is only the tip of the iceberg.
Imagine entering a caf6 in Paris with one's personal digital
assistant or mobile phone, and being able to query: "Is there any-
one on my buddy list within 100 yards? Are any of the ten closest
friends of my ten closest friends within 100 yards?" Although this
may sound fanciful, it could quickly become mainstream. With
reputation systems already advising us on what to buy, why not
have them also help us make the first cut on whom to meet, to
date, to befriend? These are not difficult services to offer, and
there are precursors today. 1 8 These systems can indicate who
117 See id.
118 For example, dodgeball.com combines online friend lists and cell-phone text mes-
saging to allow users to advertise their whereabouts to friends, see when they are near
friends of friends, and even see when their crushes are nearby. See
<http://www.dodgeball.com/> (last visited Feb 23, 2008). Loopt.com offers a similar ser-
vice. See Loopt.com, Live in It, available at <https:/Ioopt.com/loopt/sess/index.aspx> (last
visited Feb 23, 2008) ("Murn[ ] your mobile phone into a social compass"). Meetro.com
helps users chat over the Internet and connect with other Meetro users who live nearby.
See Meetro, What Is Meetro?, available at <http://meetro.com/> (last visited Feb 23, 2008).
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has not offered evidence that he or she is safe to meet-as is cur-
rently solicited by some online dating sites-or it may use Ama-
zon.com-style matching to tell us which of the strangers who
have just entered the caf6 is a good match for people who have
the kinds of friends we do. People can rate their interactions with
each other (and change their votes later, so they can show their
companion a thumbs-up at the time of the meeting and tell the
truth later on), and those ratings will inform future suggested
acquaintances. With enough people adopting the system, the act
of entering a caf6 can be different from one person to the next: for
some, the patrons may shrink away, burying their heads deeper
in their books and newspapers. For others, the entire caf6 may
perk up upon entrance, not necessarily knowing who it is but
having a lead that this is someone worth knowing. Those who do
not participate in the scheme at all will be as suspect as brand
new buyers or sellers on eBay.
Increasingly, difficult-to-shed indicators of our identity will
be recorded and captured as we go about our daily lives and en-
ter into routine transactions. Our fingerprints may be used to log
into our computers or verify our bank accounts, our photo may be
snapped and tagged many times a day, or our license plate may
be tracked as people judge our driving habits. The more our iden-
tity is associated with our daily actions, the greater opportunities
others will have to offer judgments about those actions. A gov-
ernment-run system like the one Strahilevitz recommends for
assessing driving is the easy case. If the state is the record-
keeper, it is possible to structure the system so that citizens can
know the basis of their ratings, such as where (if not by whom)
various thumbs-down clicks came from. The state can give a
chance for drivers to offer an explanation, excuse, or follow up.
The state's formula for meting out fines or other penalties to poor
drivers would be known ("three strikes and you're out," for what-
ever other problems it has, is an eminently transparent scheme),
and it could be adjusted through accountable processes the way
that legislatures already determine what constitutes illegal acts
and what range of punishment they should earn.
Generatively-grown but comprehensively popular unregu-
lated systems are much trickier. The more that we rely upon the
judgments offered by these private systems, the more harmful
mistakes can be. 119 Correcting or identifying mistakes can be
119 One prominent recent example is found in the Seattle-based start-up Avvo, which
provides ratings for attorneys. An opaque system that generated low ratings for some
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difficult if the systems are operated entirely by private parties
and their ratings formulas are closely held trade secrets. Search
engines are notoriously resistant to discussing how their rank-
ings work, in part to avoid gaming-a form of security through
obscurity. 120 The most popular engines reserve the right to inter-
vene in their automatic rankings processes, such as by adminis-
tering the Google death penalty, but otherwise suggest that they
do not manually adjust results. Hence a search in Google for
"Jew" returns an anti-Semitic website as one of its top hits,121 as
well as a separate sponsored advertisement from Google itself
explaining that its rankings are automatic. 122 But while the ob-
servance of such policies could limit worries of bias to search al-
gorithm design rather than to the case-by-case prejudices of
search-engine operators, it does not address user-specific biases
that may emerge from personalized judgments.
Amazon's automatic recommendations also make mistakes;
for a period of time the Official Lego Creator Activity Book was
paired with a "perfect partner" suggestion: American Jihad: The
Terrorists Living Among Us Today. 123 If such mismatched pair-
ings happen when discussing people rather than products, rare
mismatches could have broader effects while being no more no-
ticeable since they are not universal. The kinds of search systems
that say which people are worth getting to know and which
should be avoided, tailored to the users querying the system,
present a set of due process problems far more complicated than
a state-operated system or, for that matter, any system operated
by a single party, since there is no public entity to hold to ac-
count. The generative capacity to share data and to create mash-
prompted offended lawyers to consider pressing for damages to their practices. See John
Cook, Auvo's Attorney Rating System Draws Fire, Seattlepi.com (June 8, 2007), available
at <http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/venture/archives/l16417.asp#extended> (last vis-
ited Feb 24, 2008).
120 Gasser, Regulating Search Engines, 8 Yale J L & Tech at 232-33 (cited in note
103) (observing that search algorithms are often trade secrets).
121 See Judit Bar-Iian, Web Links and Search Engine Ranking: The Case of Google
and the Query "Jew," 57 J Am Socy for Info Sci & Tech 1581, 1582 (2006) ("the top result
for the query "Jew" on Google was a highly anti-Semitic site called Jew Watch").
122 See Google, An Explanation of Our Search Results, available at
<http://www.google.com/explanation.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2007) ("If you recently
used Google to search for the word 'Jew,' you may have seen results that were very dis-
turbing. We assure you that the views expressed by the sites in your results are not in
any way endorsed by Google.").
123 See <http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/1566868351/026-5666135-
0354819> (last visited March 24, 2003).
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ups means that ratings and rankings can be far more emergent
and far more inscrutable.
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF PRIVACY 2.0
Cheap sensors generatively wired to cheap networks with
cheap processors are transforming the nature of privacy. How
can we respond to the notion that nearly anything we do outside
our homes can be monitored and shared? How do we deal with
systems that offer judgments about what to read or buy, and
whom to meet, when they are not channeled through a public
authority or through something as suable, and therefore as ac-
countable, as Google?
The central problem is that the organizations creating,
maintaining, using, and disseminating records of identifiable
personal data are no longer just "organizations"-they are collec-
tions of far-flung people who take pictures and stream them on-
line, who blog about their reactions to a lecture or a class or a
meal, and who share on social sites rich descriptions of their
friends and interactions. These databases are becoming as pow-
erful as the ones large institutions populate and centrally define.
Yet the sorts of administrative burdens we can reasonably place
on established firms exceed those we can place on individuals-
at some point, the burden of compliance becomes so great that
the administrative burdens are tantamount to an outright ban.
That is one reason why so few radio stations are operated by in-
dividuals: it need not be capital intensive to set up a radio broad-
casting tower-a low-power neighborhood system could easily fit
in someone's attic-but the administrative burdens of complying
with telecommunications law are well beyond the abilities of a
regular citizen. Similarly, we could create a privacy regime so
complicated as to frustrate generative developments by individ-
ual users.
The 1973 U.S. government report on privacy crystallized the
template for Privacy 1.0, suggesting five elements of a code of
fair information practice:
* There must be no personal data record keeping sys-
tems whose very existence is secret.
* There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent in-
formation about him that was obtained for one purpose
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from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.
- There must be a way for an individual to correct or
amend a record of identifiable information about him.
* Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dis-
seminating records of identifiable personal data must as-
sure the reliability of the data for their intended use and
must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 124
These recommendations present a tall order for distributed,
generative systems. It may seem clear that the existence of per-
sonal data record-keeping systems ought not to be kept secret.
However, this issue was easier to address in 1973, when such
systems were typically large consumer credit databases or gov-
ernment dossiers about citizens, which could more readily be ca-
pable of being disclosed and advertised by the relevant parties. It
is harder to apply the anti-secrecy maxim to distributed personal
information databases. We live in an age in which many of us
privately maintain records or record fragments on one another.
Through peer-produced social networking services like Facebook
or MySpace, we share these records with thousands of others, or
allow them to be indexed to create powerful mosaics of personal
data. In this age, exactly what the database is changes from one
moment to the next-not simply in terms of its contents, but its
very structure and scope. Such databases may be generally un-
known while not truly "secret."'125
Further, these databases are ours. It is one thing to ask a
corporation to disclose the personal data and records it main-
tains; it is far more intrusive to demand such a thing of private
citizens. Such disclosure may itself constitute an intrusive search
upon the citizen maintaining the records. Similarly, the idea of
mandating that an individual be able to find out what an infor-
mation gatherer knows-much less to correct or amend the in-
formation-is categorically more difficult to implement when
what is known is distributed across millions of people's techno-
logical outposts. To be sure, we can Google ourselves, but this
124 Advisory Committee, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens § III (cited in
note 2).
125 See Pamela Samuelson, Five Challenges for Regulating the Global Information
Society, in Chris Marsden, ed, Regulating the Global Information Society 316, 321-22
(Routledge 2000) (describing how technological developments threaten existing means for
protecting traditional values such as "privacy, innovation, and freedom of expression").
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does not capture those databases open only to "friends of
friends"-a category that may not include us but may include
thousands of others. At the same time, we may have minimal
recourse when the information we thought we were circulating
within social networking sites merely for fun and, say, only
among fellow college students, ends up leaking to the world at
large. 126 What to do?
A. The Power of Code-Backed Norms
The Web is disaggregated. Its pieces are bound together into
a single virtual database by private search engines like Google.
Google and other search engines assign digital robots to crawl
the Web as if they were peripatetic Web surfers, clicking on one
link after another, recording the results, and placing them into a
concordance that can then be used for search. 127
Early on, some wanted to be able to publish material to the
Web without it appearing in search engines. In the way a conver-
sation at a pub is a private matter unfolding in a public (but not
publicly owned) space, these people wanted their sites to be pri-
vate but not secret. The law could offer one approach to vindicate
this desire for privacy but not secrecy. It could establish a
framework delineating the scope and nature of a right in one's
website being indexed, and providing for penalties for those who
infringe that right. An approach of this sort has well-known pit-
falls. For example, it would be difficult to harmonize such doc-
trine across various jurisdictions around the world, 128 and there
would be technical questions as to how a website owner could
signal his or her choice to would-be robot indexers visiting the
site.
The internet community, however, fixed most of the problem
before it could become intractable or even noticeable to main-
stream audiences. A software engineer named Martijn Koster
was among those discussing the issue of robot signaling on a
126 It does not just happen on social networking sites; constitutional law scholar Laur-
ence Tribe was distressed when a statement he posted on a family Web site became the
subject of public attention. See Jeffrey Rosen, Unwanted Gaze 164-65 (cited in note 48).
127 Nancy Blachman and Jerry Peek, How Google Works, available at
<http://www.googleguide.comgoogle-works.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) ("Googlebot
is Google's web crawling robot, which finds and retrieves pages on the web and hands
them off to the Google indexer.").
128 See Samuelson, Five Challenges at 323-24 (cited in note 125) (arguing that given
the tediously slow nature of the harmonization process, nations may generally be better
off seeking not complete harmonization, but "policy interoperabiity," broad agreement on
goals that allow room for flexible implementation of those goals at a later date).
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public mailing list in 1993 and 1994. Participants, including "a
majority of robot authors and other people with an interest in
robots," converged on a standard for "robots.txt," a file that web-
site authors could create that would be inconspicuous to Web
surfers but in plain sight to indexing robots. 129 Through ro-
bots.txt, site owners can indicate preferences about what parts of
the site ought to be crawled and by whom. Consensus among
some influential Web programmers on a mailing list was the only
blessing this standard received:
It is not an official standard backed by a standards body, or
owned by any commercial organisation. It is not enforced by
anybody, and there [sic] no guarantee that all current and fu-
ture robots will use it. Consider it a common facility the ma-
jority of robot authors offer the WWW community to protect
WWW server [sic] against unwanted accesses by their ro-
bots. 130
Today, nearly all Web programmers know robots.txt is the
way in which sites can signal their intentions to robots, and
these intentions are voluntarily respected by every major search
engine across differing cultures and legal jurisdictions. 131 On this
potentially contentious topic-search engines might well be more
valuable if they indexed everything, especially content marked as
something to avoid-harmony was reached without any applica-
tion of law. The robots.txt standard did not address the legalities
of search engines and robots; it merely provided a way to defuse
129 Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, available at
<http://www.robotstxt.org/wc/norobots.html> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) (detailing the
genesis of robots.txt).
130 Id.
131 See, for example, Yahoo!, How Do I Prevent You from Indexing Certain Pages,
available at <http://help.yahoo.com/l/us/yahoo/search/webcrawler/slurp-04.html> (last
visited Feb 24, 2008) (showing how to prevent indexing on Yahoo by alerting robots
through directives like robots.txt); MSN Search, Site Owner Help: Control Which Pages of
Your Website Are Indexed, available at <http://search.msn.com.sg/
docs/siteowner.aspx?t=SEARCHWEBMASTERREFRestrictAccessToSite.htm> (last
visited Feb 24, 2008) (showing how to prevent indexing on MSN Search by using a ro-
bots.txt file); Baidu, <http://www.baidu.com/search/robots.html> (last visited Feb 24,
2008) (showing use of robots.txt on foreign search engines); Google, How Do I Request
that Google Not Crawl Parts or All of My Site?, available at
<http://www.google.com/support/webmasterstbin/answer.py?answer33570&topic=8846>
(last visited Feb 24, 2008) ("[R]obots.txt is a standard document that can tell Googlebot
not to download some or all information from your web server."). For a general discussion,
see Google, Controlling How Search Engines Access and Index Your Website, available at
<http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/01/controlling-how-search-engines-access.html>
(last visited Feb 24, 2008) (explaining robots and metatags).
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many conflicts before they could even begin. The apparent legal
vulnerabilities of robots.txt, namely its lack of ownership, its
want for the backing of a large private standards-setting organi-
zation (let alone official backing), and the absence of private en-
forcement devices, may have been essential to its success. Schol-
ars have written about the increasingly important role played by
private organizations in the formation of standards across a wide
range of disciplines and the ways in which some organizations
incorporate governmental notions of due process in their activi-
ties. 132 Many internet standards have been forged much less
legalistically but still cooperatively. 133
The questions not preempted or settled by such cooperation
tend to be clashes between firms with some income stream in
dispute-and where the law has then partially weighed in. For
example, eBay sued data aggregator Bidder's Edge for using ro-
bots to scrape its site even after eBay clearly objected both in
person and through robots.txt. 134 eBay won in a case that has
made it singularly into most cyberlaw casebooks and even into a
few general property casebooks-a testament to how rarely such
disputes enter the legal system. 135
Similarly, the safe harbors of the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act of 1998 give some protection to search engines that
point customers to material that infringes copyright, 136 but they
132 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 NYU L Rev 543, 547
(2000) (exploring the increase in private participation in traditionally public governance,
where "[n]ongovernmental actors perform 'legislative' and 'adjudicative' roles, along with
many others, in a broad variety of regulatory contexts"). See also Pamela Samuelson,
Questioning Copyright in Standards, 48 BC L Rev 193, 193 (2007) (describing the uni-
form standards underpinning the information society as "an integral part of the largely
invisible infrastructure of the modern world," and offering a thorough analysis of why and
how courts should resist placing these standards under the scope of U.S. copyright protec-
tion); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 Cal L Rev 1889, 1901 (2000) (noting the importance of standard-setting organizations,
or private industry groups, in adopting, or failing to adopt, standards covered by intellec-
tual property rights based on formal and informal rules).
133 See A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 Harv L Rev 749, 777-96 (2003) (discussing the evolution of internet
standards setting).
134 See Ebay, Inc v Bidder's Edge, 100 F Supp 2d 1058, 1063 (N D Cal 2000) ("eBay
now moves for preliminary injunctive relief preventing BE from accessing the eBay com-
puter system .. ").
135 See id at 1073 ("[Bidder's Edge] are hereby enjoined pending the trial of this mat-
ter, from using any automated query program, robot, web crawler or other similar device,
without written authorization, to access eBay's computer systems or networks, for the
purpose of copying any part of eBay's auction database.").
136 17 USC § 512(d) (2000) (shielding service providers from monetary liability upon
certain conditions).
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do not shield the actions required to create the search database
in the first place. The act of creating a search engine, like the act
of surfing itself, is something so commonplace that it would be
difficult to imagine deeming it illegal. Nevertheless, this is not to
say that search engines rest on any stronger of a legal basis than
the practice of using robots.txt to determine when it is and is not
appropriate to copy and archive a website.137 Only recently, with
Google's book scanning project, have copyright holders really be-
gun to test this kind of question. 138 That challenge has arisen
over the scanning of paper books, not websites, as Google pre-
pares to make them searchable in the same way Google has in-
dexed the Web.139 The longstanding practice of website copying,
guided by robots.txt, made that kind of indexing uncontroversial
even as it is, in theory, legally cloudy.
The lasting lesson from robots.txt is that a simple, basic
standard created by people of good faith can go a long way to-
ward resolving or forestalling a problem containing strong ethi-
cal or legal dimensions. The founders of Creative Commons cre-
ated an analogous set of standards to allow content creators to
indicate how they would like their works to be used or reused.
Creative Commons licenses purport to have the force of law be-
hind them: one ignores them at the peril of infringing copyright.
Yet the main force of Creative Commons as a movement has not
been in the courts, but in cultural mindshare: alerting authors to
basic but heretofore hidden options they have for allowing use of
the photos, songs, books, or blog entries they create, and alerting
those who make use of the materials to the general orientation of
the author.
Creative Commons is robots.txt generalized. Again, the legal
underpinnings of this standard are not particularly strong. For
example, one Creative Commons option is "noncommercial,"
which allows authors to indicate that their material can be re-
137 Google prevailed, on a particularly favorable fact pattern, against one author-
plaintiff challenging the search engine's copying and distribution of his copyrighted
works. See Field v Google, 412 F Supp 2d 1106, 1118-19 (D Nev 2006) (finding Google's
copying and distribution of the copyrighted works through cached links to be a fair use on
grounds that offering access through its cache serves important social purposes and
transforms rather than supersedes the original authors' uses).
138 See Complaint, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. v Google, No 05-CV-8881, 2005 WL
2778878, at *2 (S D NY Oct 19, 2005) (alleging that Google's Library Project is violating
plaintiffs' copyrights of the scanned books).
139 See Complaint, Author's Guild v Google, No 05-CV-8136, 2006 WL 4058866, at *2
(S D NY Dec 20, 2005) (alleging that Google's contracting to create digital archives of
libraries' collections is massive copyright infringement).
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used without risk of infringement so long as the use is noncom-
mercial. But the definition of noncommercial is a model of
vagueness, the sort of definition that could easily launch a case
like eBay v Bidder's Edge. 140 If one aggregates others' blogs on a
page that has banner ads, is that a commercial use? There have
been only a handful of cases over Creative Commons licenses,
and none testing the meaning of noncommercial. 141 Rather, peo-
ple seem to know a commercial (or derivative) use when they see
it: the real power of the license may have less to do with a threat
of legal enforcement and more to do with the way it signals one's
intentions and asks that they be respected. Reliable empirical
data is absent, but the sense among many of those using Crea-
tive Commons licenses is that their wishes have been re-
spected. 142
140 See Creative Commons Legal Code, available at <http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-sa2.5/egalcode> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) ("You may not exercise any of
the rights granted to You ... in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed
toward commercial advantage or private monetary compensation.").
141 In a case brought by Adam Curry against a Dutch tabloid after the tabloid at-
tempted to republish several CC-licensed photos that Curry had posted on Flickr, the
District Court of Amsterdam found that "[in case of doubt as to the applicability and the
contents of the License, [Audax, the tabloid,] should have requested authorization for
publication from the copyright holder of the photos (Curry). Audax has failed to perform
such a detailed investigation, and has assumed too easily that publication of the photos
was allowed. Audax has not observed the conditions stated in the [Attribution-
Noncommercial-Sharealike] License...." Groklaw, Creative Commons License Upheld by
Dutch Court (Mar 16, 2006), available at <http://www.groklaw.net/
article.php?story=20060316052623594> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). However, American
law is not nearly so clear. Some commentators have suggested that in the interest of
clarifying the enforceability of these rights in the United States, Creative Commons li-
censors, when faced with some infringement of the rights they have chosen to retain,
should file cease and desist letters and force a legal decision on this issue. See Posting of
John Palfrey, Following up on the RSS/Copyright Debate, available at
<http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/palfrey/2006/07/28/following-up-on-the-rsscopyright-
debate> (last visited Feb 24, 2008). Until then, content publishers may have no way to
grapple with the "widespread abuse" and piracy of works published under Creative Com-
mons licenses. See Posting of Ethan Zuckerman to My Heart's in Accra, Can Creative
Commons and Commercial Aggregators Learn to Play Nice?, available at
<http://www.ethanzuckerman.comlblog/?p=900> (last visited Feb 24, 2008) ('"Unless these
licenses get enforced, they won't have teeth."). But see Posting of Mia Garlick to Creative
Commons Weblog, Creative Commons Licenses Enforced in Dutch Court (Mar 16, 2006),
available at <http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/5823> (last visited Feb 24, 2008)
(questioning whether the legitimacy of Creative Commons licenses should depend on
judicial validation instead of voluntary recognition of rights between private parties).
142 To be sure, it may be easy for the wishes expressed in a Creative Commons license
to be respected, since nearly every variant of the license is designed to emphasize sharing
among peers rather than restrictions. Variants that do not contemplate such sharing-for
example, the Founder's Copyright that asserts regular copyright protection but only for a
limited term, or Developing Nations, which only relaxes copyright's restrictions for cer-
tain states-are used hardly at all. See Creative Commons, License Statistics, available at
<http://wiki.creativecommons.orgfLicense-statistics> (last visited Feb 24, 2008).
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B. Applying Code-Backed Norms to Privacy: Data Genealogy
As people put data on the internet for others to use or re-
use-data that might be about other people as well as them-
selves-there are no tools to allow those who provide the data to
express their preferences about how the data ought to be indexed
or used. There is no Privacy Commons license to request basic
limits on how one's photographs ought to be reproduced from a
social networking site. There ought to be. Law professor Pamela
Samuelson has proposed that in response to the technical sim-
plicity of collecting substantial amounts of personal information
in cyberspace, a person should have a protectable right to control
this personal data. 143 She notes that a property-based legal
framework is more difficult to impose when one takes into ac-
count the multiple interests a person might have in her personal
data, and suggests a move to a contractual approach to protect-
ing information privacy based in part on enforcement of website
privacy policies. 144 Before turning to law directly, we can develop
tools to register and convey authors' privacy-related preferences
unobtrusively.
On today's internet, copying and pasting of information
takes place with no sense of metadata.145 It is difficult enough to
make sure that a Creative Commons license follows the photo-
graph, sound, or text to which it is related as those items circu-
late on the Web. But there is no standard at all to pass along for
a given work and who recorded it, with what devices, 146 and most
important, what the subject is comfortable having others do with
it. If there were, links could become two-way. Those who place
information on the Web could more readily canvass the public
uses to which that information had been put and by whom. In
turn, those who wish to reuse information would have a way of
getting in touch with its original source to request permission.
143 See, for example, Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan L
Rev 1125, 1172 (2000) (concluding that a contractual approach to protecting privacy is a
flexible and realistic solution, especially in cyberspace since websites already have pri-
vacy policies that can become "the basis of a contractual understanding between the user
and the Web site").
144 See id at 1170-73.
145 See Wikipedia, Metadata, available at <http://en.wikipedia.orgwikiMetadata>
(last visited Feb 25, 2008) ("Metadata are data about data.").
146 Flickr allows users to record data such as camera-type used, shutter speed, expo-
sure, date, photographer, geotagging data, and viewer comments, see, for example,
<http://www.flickr.com/cameras> (last visited March 20, 2008). However, no convenient
process exists for ensuring that this metadata remains attached to a photo when someone
saves it to a hard drive or reposts it on a different site.
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Some Web 2.0 outposts have generated promising rudimentary
methods for this. Facebook, for example, offers tools to label the
photographs one submits and to indicate what groups of people
can and cannot see them. Once a photo is copied beyond the
Facebook environment, however, these attributes are lost.
The Web is a complex social phenomenon with information
contributed not only by institutional sources like Britannica,
CNN, and others that place large amounts of structured informa-
tion on it, but also by amateurs like Wikipedians, Flickr con-
tributors, and bloggers. Yet a Google search intentionally
smoothes over this complexity; each linked search result is
placed into a standard format to give the act of searching struc-
ture and order. Search engines and other aggregators can and
should do more to enrich users' understanding of where the in-
formation they see is coming from. This approach would shadow
the way that Ted Nelson, coiner of the word "hypertext," envi-
sioned "transclusion," a means not simply to copy text, but also
to reference it to its original source. 147 Nelson's vision was dras-
tic in its simplicity: information would repose primarily at its
source, and any quotes to it would simply frame that source. If it
were deleted from the original source, it would disappear from its
subsequent uses. If it were changed at the source, downstream
uses would change with it. This is a strong version of the geneal-
ogy idea, since the metadata about an item's origin would actu-
ally be the item itself. For the purposes of privacy, we do not
need such a radical reworking of the copy-and-paste culture of
the Web. Rather, we need ways for people to signal whether they
would like to remain associated with the data they place on the
Web, and to be consulted about unusual uses.
This weaker signaling-based version of Nelson's vision does
not answer the legal question of what would happen if the origi-
nator of the data could not come to an agreement with someone
who wanted to use it. But as with robots.txt and Creative Com-
mons licenses, it could forestall many of the conflicts that still
147 See Wikipedia, Transclusion, available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
Transclusion> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) ("Nelson coined the term 'transclusion,' as well
as 'hypertext' and 'hypermedia', in his 1982 book, Literary Machines. Part of his proposal
was the idea that micropayments could be automatically exacted from the reader for all
the text, no matter how many snippets of content are taken from various places."). Con-
sider Ted Nelson, Literary Machines: The Report on, and of, Project Xanadu Concerning
Word Processing, Electronic Publishing, Hypertext, Thinkertoys, Tomorrow's Intellectual
Revolution, and Certain Other Topics Including Knowledge, Education and Freedom
(Nelson 1981).
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await us in the absence of any standard at all.148 Most impor-
tantly, it would help signal authorial intention not only to end
users but also to the intermediaries whose indices provide the
engines for invasions of privacy in the first place. One could indi-
cate that photos were okay to index by tag but not by facial rec-
ognition, for example. If search engines of today are any indica-
tion, such restrictions could be respected even without a defini-
tive answer as to the extent of their legal enforceability. Indeed,
by associating one's online identity-if not one's physical iden-
tity-with the various bits of data that are constantly mashed up
as people copy and paste what they like around the Web, it be-
comes possible for people to get in touch with one another more
readily to express thanks, suggest collaboration, or otherwise
interact as people in communities do. Similarly, projects like re-
CAPTCHA could seek to alert people to the extra good their solv-
ing of CAPTCHAs is doing-and even let them opt out of solving
the second word in the image, the one that is not testing whether
they are human but instead is being used to perform work for
someone else. Just as Moore v Regents of the University of Cali-
fornia 49 struggled with the issue of whether a patient whose
tumor was removed should be consulted before the tumor is used
for medical research, we will face the question of when people
ought to be informed when their online behaviors are used for
ulterior purposes, including beneficial ones.
Respect for robots.txt, Creative Commons licenses, and privacy
"tags," coupled with an opportunity to alert people and allow
them to opt in to helpful ventures with their routine online be-
havior like CAPTCHA-solving, require and promote a sense of
community. Harnessing some version of Nelson's vision is a self-
reinforcing community-building exercise, bringing people closer
together while engendering further respect for people's privacy
choices. It should be no surprise that people tend to act less
charitably in today's online environment than they would act in
the physical world.150 In today's online environment, there are
148 Consider, for example, the Internet Archive. Proprietor Brewster Kahle has thus
far avoided what one would think to be an inevitable copyright lawsuit as he archives and
makes available historical snapshots of the Web. He has avoided such lawsuits by re-
specting Web owners' wishes to be excluded as soon as he is notified. See Internet Archive
FAQ, available at <http://www.archive.org/about/faqs.php> (last visited Feb 25, 2008)
(stating that they are "not interested in preserving or offering access to Web sites or other
Internet documents of persons who do not want their materials in the collection," and
providing a notice and takedown exclusion policy).
149 Moore v Regents of the University of California, 793 P2d 479, 480 (Cal 1990).
150 Daniel Goleman, Normal Social Restraints Are Weakened in Cyberspace, Intl Her-
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few perceived rules, but there are also few ways to receive, and
therefore respect, cues from those whose content or data someone
might be using.151 By devising tools and practices to connect dis-
tant individuals already building upon one another's data, we
can promote the feedback loops found within functioning com-
munities and build a framework to allow Benkler's ideal of "shar-
ing nicely" to blossom. 162
C. Enabling Reputation Bankruptcy
As biometric readers become more commonplace in our end-
point machines, it will be possible for online destinations rou-
tinely to demand unsheddable identity tokens rather than dis-
posable pseudonyms from internet users. Many sites could bene-
fit from asking people to participate with real identities known
at least to the site, if not to the public at large. eBay, for one,
would certainly profit by making it harder for people to shift
among various ghost accounts. One could even imagine Wikipe-
dia establishing a "fast track" for contributions if they were done
with biometric assurance, just as South Korean citizen journalist
newspaper OhmyNews keeps citizen identity numbers on file for
the articles it publishes. 153 These architectures protect one's
identity from the world at large while still making it much more
difficult to produce multiple false "sock puppet" identities. When
we participate in other walks of life-school, work, PTA meet-
ings, and so on-we do so as ourselves, not wearing Groucho
mustaches, and even if people do not know exactly who we are,
ald Trib (Feb 20, 2007), available at <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/20/
business/email.php> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (explaining the psychological basis for less
stringent standards of behavior on cyberspace). For a somewhat contrary view of online
behavior, see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emer-
gence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 Va L Rev 505, 549-75 (2003)
(discussing how cooperation and the social norm of reciprocity impact online behavior).
151 See John Suler, The Online Disinhibition Effect, 7 CyberPsych & Beh 321, 322
(2004) (noting how not having facial feedback with those we are addressing online allows
us to ignore negative emotional responses to our statements).
152 See Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 Yale L J 273, 279 (2004) (noting the
economic significance of sharing between weakly-related private parties as an alternative
to market-based production and the desirability of preserving this social practice).
153 See Jonathan L. Zittrain, Private is the New Public, in Ed Richards, Robin Foster,
and Tom Kiedrowski, eds, Communications: The Next Decade 51, 61 (Ofcom 2006) (identi-
fying the trend of having "anonymous" contributors be partially identifiable through a
method like Ohmynew's national identity number-if not by name-to allow for reputa-
tion systems).
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they can recognize us from one meeting to the next. The same
should be possible for our online selves.
As real identity grows in importance on the Net, the inter-
mediaries demanding it ought to consider making available a
form of reputation bankruptcy. Like personal financial bank-
ruptcy, or the way in which a state often seals a juvenile criminal
record and gives a child a "fresh start" as an adult, 154 we ought to
consider how to implement the idea of a second or third chance in
our digital spaces. People ought to be able to express a choice to
deemphasize if not entirely delete older information that has
been generated about them by and through various systems: po-
litical preferences, activities, youthful likes and dislikes. If every
action ends up on one's "permanent record," the press conference
effect can set in. Reputation bankruptcy has the potential to fa-
cilitate desirable, experimental social behavior and break up the
monotony of static communities online and offline.155 As a safety
valve against excess experimentation, perhaps the information in
one's record could not be deleted selectively; if someone wants to
declare reputation bankruptcy, we might want it to mean throw-
ing out the good along with the bad. 156 The blank spot in one's
history would indicate a bankruptcy has been declared. This
blank spot would be the price one pays for eliminating unwanted
details.
The key is to realize that we can make design choices now
that work to capture the nuances of human relations far better
than our current systems, and that online intermediaries might
well embrace such new designs even in the absence of a legal
mandate to do so.
D. More, Not Less, Information
Reputation bankruptcy provides for the possibility of a clean
slate. It works best within hermetic systems that generate their
own data through the activities of their participants, such as so-
cial networking sites that record who is friends with whom, or
154 See, for example, Va Code Ann § 16.1-306 (Michie 2008); CRSA §19-1-306.
155 Compare, for example, Local Loan Co v Hunt, 292 US 234, 244 (1934) (noting that
providing debtors with a clean slate is "[one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act"); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv L Rev
1393 (1985) (arguing that a nonwaivable right of discharge is justified).
156 For example, eBay might allow users to delete their full feedback histories, but
prohibit selective deletion of negative reviews.
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that accumulate the various thumbs-up and thumbs-down arrays
that could be part of a "How's My Driving" style judgment.
But the use of the internet more generally to spread real-
world information about people is not amenable to reputation
bankruptcy. Once injected into the Net, an irresistible video of an
angry teacher, or a drunk and/or racist celebrity, cannot be easily
stamped out without the kinds of network or endpoint control
that are both difficult to implement and, if implemented, unac-
ceptably corrosive to the generative internet. What happens if we
accept this as fact, and also assume that legal proscriptions
against disseminating sensitive but popular data will be largely
ineffective? 157 We might turn to contextualization: the idea, akin
to the tort of false light, that harm comes from information
plucked out of the rich thread of a person's existence and expres-
sion. 158 We see this in political controversies: even the slightest
misphrasing of something can be extracted and blown out of pro-
portion. It is the reason that official press conferences are not the
same as bland conversation; they are even blander.
Contextualization suggests that the aim of an informational
system should be to allow those who are characterized within it
to augment the picture provided by a single snippet with what-
ever information, explanation, or denial that they think helps
frame what is portrayed. Civil libertarians have long suggested
that the solution to bad speech is more speech while realizing the
difficulties of linking the second round of speech to the first
without infringing the rights of the first speaker. 159 Criticisms of
the "more speech" approach have included the observation that a
retraction or amendment of a salacious newspaper story usually
appears much less prominently than the original. This is particu-
larly true for newspapers, where those seeing one piece of infor-
157 Such proscriptions may also prove difficult to reconcile with constitutional frame-
works. See, for example, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan L Rev
1049, 1051 (2000) ("While privacy protection secured by contract is constitutionally
sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free
speech law.").
158 See Jeffery Rosen, Unwanted Gaze 158 (cited in note 48) (stating that "we have
fewer opportunities to present ourselves publicly in all of our complexity. Therefore, as
more of our private lives are recorded in cyberspace, the risk that we will be unfairly
defined by isolated pieces of information that have been taken out of context has in-
creased dramatically.").
159 See, for example, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That
Wound 207 (Westview 2004) (noting that while some have argued that "[tihe cure for bad
speech is more speech," a problem arises from the fact that "hate speech is rarely an invi-
tation to dialogue; it is like a slap in the face").
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mation may not ever see the follow-up. There is also the worry
that the fog of information generated by a free-for-all is no way to
have people discern facts from lies. Generative networks invite
us to find ways to reconcile these views. We can design protocols
to privilege those who are featured or described online so that
they can provide their own framing linked to their depictions.
This may not accord with our pre-Web expectations: it may be
useful for a private newspaper to provide a right of reply to its
subjects, but such an entity would quickly invoke a First
Amendment style complaint of compelled speech if the law were
to provide for routine rights of reply in any but the narrowest of
circumstances. 160 And many of us might wish to discuss Holo-
caust deniers or racists without giving them a platform to even
link to a reply. The path forward is likely not a formal legal right
but a structure to allow those disseminating information to build
connections to the subjects of their discussions. In many cases
those of us disseminating may not object, and a properly de-
signed system might turn what would have otherwise been one-
sided exchanges into genuine dialogues.
We already see some movement in this direction. The Ken-
nedy School's Joseph Nye has suggested that a site like urban
legend debunker snopes.com be instituted for reputation, a place
that people would know to check to get the full story when they
see something scandalous but decontextualized online. 161 The
subjects of the scandalous data would similarly know to place
their answers there, perhaps somewhat mitigating the need to
link it formally to each instance of the original data. Google in-
160 This kind of compelled speech would not be unprecedented. For much of the twen-
tieth century, the FCC's Fairness Doctrine forced broadcasters to air controversial public
interest stories and provide opposing viewpoints on those issues. See Steve Rendall, The
Fairness Doctrine: How We Lost It and Why We Need It Back, Extra! (Jan/Feb 2005),
available at <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2053> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (out-
lining the history, rationale, and workings of the Fairness Doctrine). Under President
Reagan, the FCC repealed this doctrine in 1987. Id. Despite this administrative change,
the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the First Amendment to include the right
not to speak in a line of compelled speech cases. See, for example, Keller v State Bar of
California, 496 US 1, 15-16 (1990) (holding that lawyers could not be forced to pay bar
association fees to support politicians supporting purely ideological messages with which
they disagreed); Abood v Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding
that teachers could not be forced to pay union fees to support political messages with
which they disagreed).
161 Joseph Nye, Davos Day 3: Internet Privacy and Reputational Repair Sites, Huffing-
ton Post (Jan 26, 2007), available at <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/davos-
day-3-internet-pri-b-39750.html> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) ("the virtual world could
provide a site where anyone who felt that a quote or picture was out of context or misrep-
resented, their views could say so for the record.").
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vites people quoted or discussed within news stories to offer ad-
denda and clarification directly to Google, which posts it promi-
nently near its link to the story when it is a search result within
Google News. Services like reputationdefender.com will, for a fee,
take on the task of trying to remove or, failing that, contextualize
sensitive information about people online.162 ReputationDefender
uses a broad toolkit of tactics to try to clear up perceived inva-
sions of privacy, mostly moral suasion rather than legal threat.
Contextualization addresses just one slice of the privacy
problem, since it only adds information to a sensitive depiction. If
the depiction is embarrassing or humiliating, the opportunity to
express that one is indeed embarrassed or humiliated does not
help much. Values of privacy may be implacably in tension with
some of the fruits of generativity. Just as the digital copyright
problem could be solved if publishers could find a way to profit
from abundance rather than scarcity, the privacy problem could
be solved if we could take Sun Microsystems CEO McNealy's ad-
vice and simply get over it. This is not a satisfying rejoinder to
someone whose privacy has been invaded, but, amazingly, this
may be precisely what is happening: people are getting over it.
E. The Generational Divide: Beyond Informational Privacy
The values animating our concern for privacy are themselves
in transition. Many have noted an age-driven gap in attitudes
about privacy perhaps rivaled only by the 1960's generation gap
on rock and roll.163 Surveys bear out some of this perception.164
Fifty-five percent of online teens have created profiles on sites
162 See <http://www.reputationdefender.com> (last visited Feb 25, 2007). Reputation-
Defender was started by a former student of mine, and I once served on its advisory
board. The firm has itself been the subject of some controversy. See, for example, Posting
of Ann Bartow to Feminist Law Professors, Well, Those 'ReputationDefender" Guys Cer-
tainly are Well Connected, Anyway, (Apr 8, 2007), available at
<http://feministlawprofs.law.sc.edu/?p=1671> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (questioning the
decision to not invite a representative of AutoAdmit to a ReputationDefender conference
at Harvard, where AutoAdmit was specifically mentioned as a topic).
163 Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, NY Magazine 1-2 (Feb 12, 2007), available at <
http://nymag.com/news/features/27341/> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (comparing the mod-
ern generation gap between young and old in attitudes on privacy to the differential re-
ception of rock and roll).
164 People aged fifty to sixty-four are almost twice as likely as young people to worry
about privacy online. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Online Newcom-
ers More Middle-Brow, Less Work-Oriented: The Internet News Audience Goes Ordinary
24 (1999), available at <http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/72.pdf> (last visited Feb 25,
2008) (CYoung people show the least concern about their privacy (only 17% worry a lot),
those aged 50-64 the most (32% worry a lot).").
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like MySpace, though sixty-six percent of those use tools that the
sites offer to limit access in some way.165 Teens are more than
twice as likely as adult internet users to have a blog.166 Interest-
ingly, while young people appear eager to share information
online, they are more worried than older people about govern-
ment surveillance. 167 Some also see that their identities may be
discovered online, even with privacy controls. 168
A large part of the personal information available on the
Web about those born after 1985 comes from the subjects them-
selves. People routinely set up pages on social networking sites-
in the United States, more than eighty-five percent of university
students are said to have an entry in facebook.com-and they
impart reams of photographs, views, and status reports about
their lives, updated to the minute. Friends who tag other friends
in photographs cause those photos to be automatically associated
with everyone mentioned, a major step toward the world in
which simply showing up to an event is enough to make one's
photo and name permanently searchable online in connection
with the event.
Worries about such a willingness to place personal informa-
tion online can be split into two categories. The first is explicitly
paternalistic: children may lack the judgment to know when they
should and should not share their personal information. As with
other decisions that could bear significantly on their lives-
signing contracts, drinking, or seeing movies with violent or sex-
ual content-perhaps younger people should be protected from
165 Memorandum from Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, Research Fellows, Pew
Internet and American Life Project, on Social Networking Websites and Teens: An Over-
view 5 (Jan 7, 2007), available at <http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPSNS_
DataMemoJan_2007.pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2008). See also Amanda Lenhart and
Mary Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks: How Teens Manage Their
Online Identities and Personal Information in the Age of Myspace, at v (Apr 18, 2007),
available at <http://www.pewinternet.orgpdfs/PIPTeensPrivacySNSReport_Final.
pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (noting that fifty-three percent of parents of online teens
have installed filtering software on home computers to protect their children).
166 Amanda Lenhart and Mary Madden, Teen Content Creators and Consumers 5 (Nov
2, 2005), available at <http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPTeensContentCreation.
pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) ("While one teen in five keeps a blog, about 7% of adult
internet users say the same.").
167 See Justin Berton, The Age of Privacy: Gen Y Not Shy Sharing Online-But Wor-
ries About Spying, SanFran Chron Al (May 20, 2006) ("On the one hand, she and millions
of citizens under 30 are actively engaging in online exhibitionism without fear of conse-
quences. On the other hand, they seem more concerned than their parents about govern-
ment eavesdropping in the name of U.S. security.").
168 Lenhart and Madden, Teens, Privacy & Online Social Networks (cited in note 165)
(finding that "40% of teens with profiles online think that it would be hard for someone to
find out who they are from their profile, but that they could eventually be found online.").
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rash decisions that facilitate infringements of their privacy. The
second relies more on the generative mosaic concern expressed
earlier: people might make rational decisions about sharing their
personal information in the short term, but underestimate what
might happen to that information as it is indexed, reused, and
repurposed by strangers. Both worries have merit, and to the
extent that they do we could deploy the tools of intermediary ga-
tekeeping to try to protect people below a certain age until they
wise up. This is just the approach of the U.S. Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA"). 169 COPPA fits com-
fortably but ineffectually within a Privacy 1.0 framework, as it
places restrictions on operators of websites and services that
knowingly gather identifiable information from children under
the age of thirteen: they cannot do so without parental consent.
The result is discernable in most mainstream websites that col-
lect data; each now presents a checkbox for the user to affirm
that he or she is over thirteen, or asks outright for a birthday or
age. The result has been predictable; kids quickly learn simply to
enter an age greater than thirteen in order to get to the services
they want.170 It will take levels of intervention that so far seem
to exceed the willingness of any jurisdiction to achieve effective
limits on the flow of information about kids. 171 The most common
scheme to separate kids from adults online is to identify individ-
ual network endpoints as used primarily or frequently by kids
and then limit what those endpoints can do: PCs in libraries and
169 15 USC §§ 6502-06 (2000) (regulating the "collection and use of personal informa-
tion from and about children on the Internet").
170 The FTC provides updates on COPPA enforcement on its Web page. The agency
has filed twelve cases since COPPA was enacted, and only one in the past three years.
See FTC, Privacy Initiatives, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives
childrensenf.html> (last visited Feb 25, 2008). According to one source, seventy-seven
percent of children aged eight to seventeen who were surveyed said they would lie about
their age in order to do something they were restricted from doing on a Web site. Isabel
Walcott, Online Privacy and Safety Survey, available at <http://web.archive.org/web/
20001202110700/http://www.smartgirl.comlpress/privacyfindings.html> (last visited Feb
25, 2008).
171 The U.S. Children's Online Protection Act and its predecessors also struggled with
how to protect kids from receiving information that could be harmful to them, such as
pornography that adults have a right to see. The most restrictive approach has been to
ask providers of information online to assume that kids are receiving it unless each per-
son accessing can demonstrate possession of a valid credit card. See 47 USC § 231(c)(1)
(2000) (shielding providers if they restrict access to harmful materials "by requiring use
of a credit card .. .'). This approach was struck down as unconstitutional. ACLU v
Ashcroft, 322 F3d 240 (3d Cir 2003), affd and remanded, 542 US 656 (2004).
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public schools are often locked down with filtering software,
sometimes due to much-litigated legal requirements. 172
A shift to tethered appliances, those for which their vendors
are privileged to change how they work long after they have left
the factory, could greatly lower the costs of discerning age online.
Many appliances could be initialized at the time of acquisition
with the birthdays of their users, or sold assuming use by chil-
dren until unlocked by the vendor after receiving proof of age.
This is exactly how many tethered mobile phones with internet
access are sold, 173 and because they do not allow third-party code
they can be much more securely configured to only access certain
approved websites. With the right standards in place, PCs could
broadcast to every website visited that they have not been
unlocked for adult browsing, and such websites could then be
regulated through a template like COPPA to restrict the trans-
mission of certain information that could harm the young users.
This is a variant of Lessig's idea for a "kid enabled browser,"'174
made much more robust because a tethered appliance is difficult
to hack.
These paternalistic interventions assume that people will be
more careful about what they put online once they grow up. And
even those who are not more careful and regret it have exercised
their autonomy in ways that ought to be respected. But the gen-
erational divide on privacy appears to be more than the higher
carelessness or risk tolerance of kids. Many of those growing up
with the internet appear not only reconciled to a public dimen-
sion to their lives-famous for at least fifteen people-but eager
to launch it. Their notions of privacy transcend the Privacy 1.0
plea to keep certain secrets or private facts under control. In-
172 Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), Pub L No 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114
Stat 2763, 2763A-335 to 2763A-352 (2000), codified as amended at 20 USC § 9134 and 47
USC § 254 (requiring certain schools and libraries to provide internet safety). While one
federal court held that the CIPA is unconstitutional, see American Library Association,
Inc v United States, 201 F Supp 2d 401 (E D Pa 2002), the Supreme Court subsequently
reversed that decision and affirmed the Act's constitutionality. See United States v Amer-
ican Library Association, Inc, 539 US 194 (2003).
173 See, for example, Vodafone, Content Control, available at <http://online.vod-
fone.co.uk/dispatch/Portal/appmanager/vodafone/wrpnfpb--true&-pageLabel=templatel
1&pageID=PAV 0024&redirectedByRedirectsImplServletFlag-true> (last visited Feb 25,
2008) (providing an overview of the content control service, limiting access to online con-
tent for those under 18 but allowing those over 18 to lift content control by proving their
age).
174 Posting to Furd Log, Lessig and Zittrain-Pornography and Jurisdiction, available
at <http://msll.mit.edulfurdlog/?p=383> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) ("How about a kid-
enabled browser? Parents could set up children's computers, so parents have the burden,
instead of the porn consumer.").
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stead, by digitally furnishing and nesting within publicly-
accessible online environments, they seek to make such envi-
ronments their own. MySpace, currently the third most popular
website in the United States and sixth most popular in the
world, 175 is evocatively named: it implicitly promises its users
that they can decorate and arrange their personal pages to be
expressive of themselves. Nearly every feature of a MySpace
home page can be reworked by its occupant, and that is exactly
what occupants do, drawing on tools provided by MySpace and
developers. 176 This is generativity at work: MySpace program-
mers creating platforms that can in turn be directed and re-
shaped by users with less technical talent but more individual-
ized creative energy. The most salient feature of privacy for
MySpace users is not secrecy so much as autonomy: a sense of
control over their home bases, even if what they post can later
escape its confines. Privacy is about establishing a locus which
we can call our own without undue intervention or interrup-
tion-a place where we can vest our identities. That vesting can
happen most directly in a particular location-"your home is
your castle"-and, as law professor Margaret Radin explains, it
can also happen with objects. 177 She had in mind a ring or other
heirloom, but an iPod containing one's carefully selected music
and video can fit the bill as well. Losing such a thing hurts more
than the mere pecuniary value of obtaining a fresh one. MySpace
pages, blogs, and similar online outposts can be repositories for
our identities for which personal control, not secrecy, is the
touchstone.
175 Alexa, Traffic Rankings for Myspace.com, available at <http://www.alexa.coml
data/details/trafficdetails?q=&url=myspace.coml> (last visited Feb 25, 2008).
176 See MySpace.com, How Do I Add Color, Graphics, & Sound to My Profile Page?,
available at <http://www.myspace.comlModuleslHelp/Pages/HelpCenter.aspx?Category-
4&Question=7> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (showing how to modify your personal profile
on MySpace); David F. Carr, Inside MySpace.com, Baseline Magazine (Jan 16, 2007),
available at <http://www.baselinemag.com/c/a/Projects-Networks-and-Storage/Inside-
MySpacecoml> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (reviewing the history of MySpace.com and its
customizability).
177 See Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan L Rev 957, 959-60
(1982) ("Most people possess objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects
are closely bound up with personhood because of the way we constitute ourselves as con-
tinuing personal entities in the world. They may be different as people are different, but
some common examples might be a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house...
The opposite of holding an object that has become part of oneself is holding an object that
is perfectly replaceable with other goods of equal market value. One holds such an object
for purely instrumental reasons.").
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V. CONCLUSION
The 1973 U.S. government privacy report observed:
An agrarian, frontier society undoubtedly permitted much
less personal privacy than a modern urban society, and a
small rural town today still permits less than a big city. The
poet, the novelist, and the social scientist tell us, each in his
own way, that the life of a small-town man, woman, or family
is an open book compared to the more anonymous existence of
urban dwellers. Yet the individual in a small town can retain
his confidence because he can be more sure of retaining con-
trol. He lives in a face-to-face world, in a social system where
irresponsible behavior can be identified and called to account.
By contrast, the impersonal data system, and faceless users
of the information it contains, tend to be accountable only in
the formal sense of the word. In practice they are for the most
part immune to whatever sanctions the individual can in-
voke. 178
Enduring solutions to the new generation of privacy prob-
lems brought about by the generative internet will have as their
touchstone tools of connection and accountability among the peo-
ple who produce, transform, and consume personal information
and expression: tools to bring about social systems to match the
power of the technical one. Today's internet is an uncomfortable
blend of the personal and the impersonal. It can be used to build
and refine communities and to gather people around common
ideas and projects. 179 In contrast, it can also be seen as an imper-
sonal library of enormous scale: faceless users perform searches
and then click and consume what they see. Many among the new
generation of people growing up with the internet are enthusias-
tic about its social possibilities. They are willing to put more of
themselves into the network and are more willing to meet and
converse with those they have never met in person. They may
not experience the same divide that Twain observed between our
public and private selves. Photos of their drunken exploits on
178 Advisory Committee, Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens § II (cited in
note 2).
179 PledgeBank, for example, encourages people to take action by exchanging com-
mitments to undertake an activity. See <http://www.pledgebank.com> (last visited Feb
25, 2008) (allowing people to make commitments to act if others join them or otherwise
help). Meetup helps people find and arrange events with others who share common inter-
ests. See <http://www.meetup.com/> (last visited Feb 25, 2008).
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facebook.com might indeed hurt their job prospects, 180 but soon
those making hiring decisions will themselves have had Face-
book pages. The differential between our public and private
selves might be largely resolved as we develop digital environ-
ments in which views can be expressed and then later revised.
Our missteps and mistakes will not be cause to stop the digital
presses. Instead the good along with the bad will form part of a
dialogue with both the attributes of a small town and a "world
where anyone, anywhere may express his or her beliefs, no mat-
ter how singular, without fear of being coerced into silence or
conformity."'181 Such an environment will not be perfect: there
will be Star Wars Kids who wish to retract their private embar-
rassing moments and who cannot. But it will be better than one
without powerful generative instrumentalities, one where the
tools of monitoring are held and monopolized by the faceless in-
stitutions anticipated and feared in 1973.
180 Similarly, see Alison Doyle, To Blog or Not to Blog?, available at
<http://jobsearch.about.com/od/jobsearchblogs/a/jobsearchblog.htm> (last visited Feb 25,
2008) ("Employees have been fired when their employer construed their blog posts as
sharing confidential information, making inappropriate comments about the company, or
both."); Ellen Goodman, Editorial, The Perils of Cyberbaggage, Truthdig (Feb 21, 2007),
available at <http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20070221_the-perils-of-
cyberbaggage/> (last visited Feb 25, 2008) (noting the resignation of two political cam-
paign volunteers based on comments they made on their blogs); Ellen Goodman, Two
Worlds, Two Women: Bloggers Get Caught Between the Real and the Cyber, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette B7 (Feb 23, 2007) (same); MySpace Is Public Space When It Comes to Job
Search: Entry Level Job Seekers - It's Time to Reconsider the Web, CollegeGrad.com (July
26, 2006), available at <http://www.collegegrad.com/press/myspace.shtml> (last visited
Feb 25, 2008) ("47% of college grad job seekers who use social networking sites such as
MySpace and Facebook have either already changed or plan to change the content of their
pages as a result of their job search.").
181 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb 8, 1996),
available at <http:/Ihomes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html> (last visited Feb 25,
2008).
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